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14 *behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated*

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26 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
27 DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

28 Victor Parsons; Shawn Jensen; Stephen Swartz;  
Dustin Brislan; Sonia Rodriguez; Christina  
Verduzco; Jackie Thomas; Jeremy Smith; Robert  
Gamez; Maryanne Chisholm; Desiree Licci; Joseph  
Hefner; Joshua Polson; and Charlotte Wells, on  
behalf of themselves and all others similarly  
situated; and Arizona Center for Disability Law,

Plaintiffs,

v.

David Shinn, Director, Arizona Department of  
Corrections, Rehabilitation and Reentry; and  
Larry Gann, Assistant Director, Medical Services  
Contract Monitoring Bureau, Arizona Department  
of Corrections, Rehabilitation and Reentry, in their  
official capacities,

Defendants.

No. CV 12-00601-PHX-ROS

**EXPERT DECLARATION  
AND DIRECT WRITTEN  
TESTIMONY OF  
PABLO STEWART, M.D.**

1 Pursuant to the Court’s September 2, 2021 Order (Doc. 3952 at 4), I, Pablo  
 2 Stewart, M.D., hereby declare and submit my direct written testimony as follows. I will be  
 3 called by Plaintiffs to testify to the Court under oath via videoconference regarding the  
 4 following at 9:00 am on November 3, 2021. For ease of reference by the Court, I  
 5 include a table of contents for the topics covered herein.

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1 **I. Background / Expert Qualifications**

2 1. I am a physician licensed to practice in the states of California and Hawai'i,  
3 and maintain a practice in clinical and forensic psychiatry. I am currently a Clinical  
4 Professor and Psychiatrist at the Burns School of Medicine at the University of Hawai'i.  
5 As part of my academic duties, I serve as an attending psychiatrist at the Oahu  
6 Community Correctional Center and supervise psychiatry residents assigned to work at  
7 the facility. I have extensive experience in forensic and correctional psychiatry, including  
8 monitoring conditions of confinement and assessing policies, procedures, and protocols  
9 for the adequacy of mental health and medical care in custodial settings.

10 2. In 1973, I obtained a Bachelor of Science in chemistry from the U.S. Naval  
11 Academy, and served in the U.S. Marine Corps from 1973 to 1978. I received my Doctor  
12 of Medicine degree from the University of California, San Francisco ("UCSF") School of  
13 Medicine in 1982. I also completed my residency in Psychiatry at UCSF. In 1985, I  
14 received the Mead-Johnson American Psychiatric Association Fellowship for  
15 demonstrated commitment to public sector psychiatry and was selected as the Outstanding  
16 Psychiatric Resident by the graduating class at UCSF. In 1985-1986, I was the Chief  
17 Resident for the Department of Psychiatry at UCSF Hospital and San Francisco General  
18 Hospital ("SF General"). I am board-certified in psychiatry.

19 3. I have held numerous positions with responsibility for ensuring quality  
20 clinical services at inpatient and community-based programs, and maintaining the  
21 psychological well-being of incarcerated people, formerly incarcerated people, and  
22 unhoused persons. I have extensive clinical, research, and academic experience in the  
23 diagnosis, treatment, and community care programs for persons with psychiatric  
24 disorders, and the management of patients in institutionalized populations with dual  
25 diagnoses, including psychotic disorders. From 1986 to 1990, I was the Senior Attending  
26 Psychiatrist at the Forensic Unit at UCSF Hospital and SF General, where I was  
27 responsible for a twelve-bed maximum-security psychiatric ward. From 1988 to 1989, I  
28

1 was the Director of Forensic Psychiatric Services for the City and County of San  
2 Francisco, and had administrative and clinical responsibilities for psychiatric services for  
3 the jail population. My duties included direct clinical and administrative responsibility for  
4 the Jail Psychiatric Services and Forensic Unit at SF General. From 1991 to 1996, I served  
5 the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center in San Francisco as: Medical  
6 Director of the Comprehensive Homeless Center (where I had overall responsibility for  
7 the medical and psychiatric services at the Homeless Center for unhoused veterans); Chief  
8 of the Intensive Psychiatric Community Care Program (a community-based case  
9 management program); Chief of the Substance Abuse Inpatient Unit (where I had overall  
10 clinical and administrative responsibilities for the unit); and Psychiatrist for the Substance  
11 Abuse Inpatient Unit (where I provided consultation to the Medical / Surgical Units  
12 regarding patients with substance abuse problems). From 1991 to 2006, I served as the  
13 Chief of Psychiatric Services at the Haight Ashbury Free Clinic, which serves a large  
14 population of unhoused and/or formerly incarcerated persons.

15 4. Concurrent to this professional work, I have held several academic  
16 appointments where I actively supervise medical students, residents, and fellows in  
17 psychiatry. As noted above, I am currently a Clinical Professor and Psychiatrist at the  
18 Burns School of Medicine at the University of Hawai'i. At UCSF School of Medicine's  
19 Department of Psychiatry, I was a Clinical Professor from 2006 to 2018; Associate  
20 Clinical Professor from 1995-2006; Assistant Clinical Professor from 1989-95; and  
21 Clinical Instructor from 1986-89. I received multiple awards for "Excellence in Teaching"  
22 and "Outstanding Faculty Member of the Year," including the academic years 1985-86,  
23 1986-87, 1988-89, 1990-91, 1994-95 and 2014-15.

24 5. As an expert for more than 30 years, I have rendered professional assistance  
25 to courts, governmental agencies, and counsel for incarcerated people with regard to  
26 managing, monitoring, and reforming correctional mental health and medical care  
27 systems, including the implementation of remedial decrees in conditions of confinement  
28 cases; assessing the quality of medical and mental health care provided to incarcerated

1 people; and opining as to conditions of confinement that aggravate or exacerbate  
2 traumatic symptoms and mental illness. My responsibilities include inspecting  
3 correctional institutions, reviewing custodial, medical, and mental health care policies and  
4 procedures, and rendering an opinion on the risks posed to incarcerated populations by  
5 inadequate or ineffective custodial and health care procedures. I have served as an expert  
6 witness and consultant in this case since 2012.

7         6. Most recently, from 2016 to the present, I have been the court-appointed  
8 monitor to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois in *Rasho v. Baldwin*, a  
9 statewide class action regarding mental health care in the Illinois state prison system.  
10 From 2014 to the present, I have served as an expert in *Hernandez v. County of Monterey*,  
11 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. In 2014, I participated in  
12 a year-long review of segregated housing units for the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Special  
13 Housing Unit Review. From 2008 to 2019, I served as an expert in *Graves v. Arpaio*, a  
14 case before this Court involving conditions in the Maricopa County Jail. I was an expert in  
15 the U.S. Supreme Court case *Brown v. Plata*, 563 U.S. 493 (2011), and my opinion is  
16 cited in that decision. *Id.* at 519 and n. 6. From 1998 to 2004, I was a psychiatric  
17 consultant to the Institute on Crime, Justice and Corrections at George Washington  
18 University, which monitored the agreement between the U.S. Department of Justice and  
19 the State of Georgia to improve the quality of that State's juvenile justice facilities, critical  
20 mental health, medical, and educational services, and treatment programs. From 2003 to  
21 2004, I monitored the provisions of a settlement between incarcerated people and the New  
22 Mexico Corrections Department about conditions in the Department's "supermax" unit. I  
23 have testified numerous times in state and federal courts as an expert and provided expert  
24 opinions relied on by federal district courts, the federal Courts of Appeals, and the  
25 Supreme Court. My current CV is attached as **Exhibit 1**.

## 26 **II. Basis for Opinion, Information Reviewed, and Methodology**

27         7. In 2012 I was retained by Plaintiffs' counsel in *Parsons v. Ryan* to provide  
28 expert opinions on matters relating to whether the system of providing mental health care

1 and conditions of confinement for people with mental illness in the custody of the Arizona  
2 Department of Corrections (ADC, now known as ADCRR) met constitutional minima. In  
3 the intervening nine years, I have stayed abreast regarding the provision of mental health  
4 care to people in the State's prisons, and have provided this Court with 18 declarations or  
5 expert reports that pertain directly to those issues:

- 6 • Declaration in support of class certification, dated November 6, 2012  
7 (Doc. 292, Ex. B)
- 8 • Declaration regarding the risk of injury due to excessive heat exposure to  
9 people prescribed psychotropic medications, dated September 15, 2013  
10 (Doc. 663)
- 11 • Expert report describing the delivery of mental health care, conditions of  
12 confinement that I observed at various ADC facilities in 2013, information  
13 obtained from class members in interviews, and my analysis of the mental  
14 health care, dated November 8, 2013 (Doc. 1104-2)
- 15 • Supplemental expert report, dated December 9, 2013 (Doc. 1104-6, Ex. 8)
- 16 • Rebuttal expert report, dated January 31, 2014 (Doc. 1104-6, Ex. 9)
- 17 • Second supplemental expert report, dated February 24, 2014 (Doc. 1104-6,  
18 Ex. 10)
- 19 • Third supplemental expert report, dated August 29, 2014 (Doc. 1538-1, Ex.  
20 2)
- 21 • Declaration and expert report in support of motion to enforce the  
22 Stipulation, dated March 30, 2016 (Doc. 1538-1)
- 23 • Declaration regarding the length of mental health encounters and patient  
24 suicides, dated July 8, 2016 (Doc. 1627)
- 25 • Declaration regarding confidential mental health encounters, dated  
26 August 5, 2016 (Doc. 1852)
- 27 • Declaration regarding the very high rates of refusal of out-of-cell time by  
28 people in isolation units, dated February 1, 2017 (Doc. 1939)
- Declaration regarding class member suicides, and remedial efforts for  
Stipulation Performance Measure 94, dated May 28, 2017 (Doc. 2091)
- Declaration regarding my visit to ASPC-Eyman in January 2019 and  
conditions in the isolation units, dated February 19, 2019 (Doc. 3158)
- Declaration in response to Court order regarding the frequency and length of  
mental health encounters, dated February 27, 2020 (Doc. 3511)
- Declaration regarding confidential post-partum mental health encounters,  
dated March 18, 2020 (Doc. 3532-1)

- 1 • Declaration regarding language interpretation and effective communication  
2 in mental health encounters, dated June 10, 2020 (Doc. 3626)
- 3 • Declaration regarding the duration of mental health encounters, dated  
4 August 14, 2020 (Doc. 3694-3)
- 5 • Declaration regarding class member suicides and monitoring of mental  
6 health performance measures, dated October 14, 2020 (Doc. 3782)

7 8. Given the Court's order that the parties prepare for trial in this matter,  
8 Plaintiffs' counsel has asked me to update my earlier opinions, based upon a review of  
9 current ADCRR and Centurion policies, procedures, and practices; a review of various  
10 documents and class members' medical charts; and on-site inspections and class member  
11 interviews that I personally conducted.<sup>1</sup> I visited the following state prison complexes in  
12 September 2021 that at the time had specially designated mental health programs and  
13 housing units within them: Arizona State Prison Complex ("ASPC")-Eyman (Sept. 8,  
14 2021); ASPC-Tucson (Sept. 9, 2021); ASPC-Perryville (Sept. 10, 2021); and ASPC-  
15 Phoenix (Sept. 23, 2021). In the course of my September 2021 inspections, I visited  
16 housing units where people classified as seriously mentally ill ("SMI") are incarcerated,  
17 any units designated for people with mental health needs (regardless of classification),  
18 mental health watch units, segregated isolation units including maximum custody and  
19 detention units, and I interviewed class members incarcerated in these units.<sup>2</sup>

20 9. As I have done in prior tours and inspections, I personally interviewed a  
21 number of class members. Prior to the tours, I asked Plaintiffs' counsel to review the most  
22 recent months' self-harm logs and mental health watch logs maintained by ADCRR and  
23 Centurion, to identify persons at the four prisons who appeared frequently on the logs (for  
24 repeated acts of self-harm or multiple stays on suicide watch), or persons with very long  
lengths of stay on mental watch, so that I could affirmatively attempt to speak to these

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25 <sup>1</sup> I am being compensated for my work in this case at a rate of \$300 per hour, with  
26 a daily cap of \$2500.

27 <sup>2</sup> I previously visited the following Arizona state prisons in connection with this  
28 case: ASPC-Eyman (July 16, 2013 and January 25, 2019); ASPC-Florence (July 15,  
2013); ASPC-Lewis (July 22, 2013 and November 13-14, 2018); ASPC-Perryville (July  
18, 2013); ASPC-Phoenix (July 19, 2013 and January 10, 2019); ASPC-Tucson (July 8-9,  
2013 and January 8-9, 2019); and ASPC-Yuma (July 23, 2013)

1 persons when I was at the facilities. Holding aside seeking out these people and persons  
2 who I've previously spoken to on past visits, all other class members who I spoke to on  
3 the tours were chosen randomly by walking through the housing units and going cell-to-  
4 cell, asking people to speak to me cell-front. Speaking to them cell-front or in their living  
5 unit gives me the opportunity to observe the patient's housing situation, as well as their  
6 ability to maintain a neat "house" where they live. To the extent that time permitted, I also  
7 made a point to request to pull a sample of these people out of their cells who I wanted to  
8 speak to for longer periods of time in a private confidential setting, in order to have a  
9 more in-depth clinical and therapeutic encounter with them.

10 10. I do not speak to (or review records of) a random sample of *all* people in  
11 ADCRR custody, nor should I; rather, my methodology is to focus on persons with the  
12 most serious mental health concerns or diagnoses. While all people in ADCRR custody  
13 could doubtless benefit from a more therapeutic milieu and environment, I focus on the  
14 persons with the most profound mental health concerns, because these are the patients that  
15 a functioning correctional mental health care system should at a minimum prioritize and  
16 focus on. As on past tours in conducting my interviews of mentally ill class members,  
17 often housed in isolation units or watch units, I found many people displaying severe and  
18 disabling mental health conditions, who were profoundly mentally ill or psychotic, or  
19 engaging in ongoing acts of self-harm. I observed many people with severe mental illness  
20 who were in fragile conditions.

21 11. I also focused my review of patients' medical records before and after my  
22 visits to analyze the mental health care they are receiving. In some cases, I was assisted in  
23 my review of medical records by another psychiatrist, Dr. Greg Nikogosyan. I supervised  
24 his medical file review – he went through some patients' medical charts to make a record  
25 of dates of prescriptions and psychiatry encounters. I analyzed Dr. Nikogosyan's  
26 summary of the documentation of the medical records, and then to the extent necessary  
27 supplemented with my own file review, and then created my own analysis and  
28 conclusions regarding each patient's care.



1           12. I reviewed the medical records and drafted summaries regarding the care of  
2 15 persons discussed in my 2013 Expert Report who remain in the custody of ADCRR, to  
3 determine the course of their mental health care over the intervening eight years. I also  
4 reviewed the medical records and drafted summaries of approximately 50 class members  
5 whom I spoke to on the September 2021 visits to the four prisons. These medical file  
6 record review write-ups are appended to this report as **Exhibit 2**.

7           13. I also reviewed medical records of 15 of the 23 patients in ADCRR custody  
8 who have died by suicide from 2019 to September 2021. After each death by suicide of an  
9 incarcerated person, ADCRR is required to conduct a psychological autopsy, or “psych  
10 autopsy” designed to identify any causes that led to the patient’s suicide, and whether the  
11 suicide was preventable. ADCRR staff must complete a psych autopsy within 30 days of  
12 the person’s death: Defendants provided 20 psych autopsies, which I reviewed. In  
13 addition, pursuant to state law, ADCRR is required to complete a mortality review after  
14 any death in custody; these serve a similar function and should be completed within 10  
15 days of ADCRR receiving the local county medical examiner’s report. Health Services  
16 Technical Manual, Chapter 7, Section 7.1, “Inmate Mortality.” Defendants provided 20  
17 mortality reviews for patients who died by suicide. My write-ups of the care of these  
18 people who died by suicide are appended to this report as **Exhibit 3**.

19           14. The systemic problems in the delivery of mental health care that I found on  
20 this round of visits and document review are consistent with my past observations. I  
21 include more recent and current illustrative examples throughout my report to show the  
22 flesh-and-blood impact of the systemic problems. However, as shown in Exhibits 2 and 3,  
23 the cases described in the main body of the report are not the only examples of these  
24 systemic problems.

25           15. This opinion is also based upon the monitoring reports, medical records, my  
26 past reports and declarations, and other ADCRR and Centurion documents in connection  
27 with this case. In addition to my past reports and declarations listed above, and documents  
28 and references cited within this report, a list of documents that were reviewed and that

1 form the basis of this opinion are listed in **Exhibit 4**. A list of the class members whom I  
2 interviewed in the course of the September 2021 tours is **Exhibit 5**. The photos taken by  
3 ADCRR staff during these visits are attached as **Exhibit 6** and also appear within this  
4 report. These exhibits are all incorporated herein to my testimony.

5 **III. Opinion: Mental Health Care Provided by ADCRR Does Not Meet**  
6 **Minimum Standards of Care**

7 16. In summary, it continues to be my expert opinion that the mental health  
8 treatment provided to class members does not meet the minimum standard of care in a  
9 number of interrelated and interacting ways, as described more fully below. The operation  
10 and delivery of mental health care to people in ADCRR's custody places them at  
11 substantial risk of serious harm.

12 17. It is my opinion that the chronic shortage of mental health staff, delays in  
13 providing or the outright failure to provide mental health treatment, the inadequacies in  
14 the provision of psychiatric medications, and the other deficiencies identified in this report  
15 are systemic problems, and incarcerated people who need mental health care have already  
16 experienced, and will experience, a serious risk of injury to their health if these problems  
17 are not addressed. In my experience in correctional mental health care, these types of  
18 systemic problems have been addressed through an injunction directed against the  
19 directors and administrators of the prison system.

20 **A. Opinion: There Are Inadequate Numbers and Types of Mental Health Staff**

21 18. It is my opinion that the pervasive and longstanding failure to have adequate  
22 numbers of mental health care staff undermine the ability of providers and clinicians to  
23 provide minimally adequate mental health care services. Sufficient numbers of qualified  
24 mental health staff are the foundation of any minimally adequate correctional mental  
25 health care system. Without a sufficient number of properly qualified mental health staff,  
26 it is impossible to provide adequate mental health treatment.

27 19. During my involvement in this case, from 2012 to now, I've been struck by  
28 the chronic and extreme shortage of mental health staff in ADCRR. Like many other state

1 prison systems, ADCRR has been left with the task of caring for many of the most  
2 profoundly mentally ill people who live in the State of Arizona. These people struggle  
3 with debilitating chronic mental health conditions, and in an earlier era might have been  
4 confined to state mental hospitals. Accordingly, ensuring a sufficient number and type of  
5 mental health staff are working in the prisons is of the utmost paramount importance and  
6 in the public interest.

7         20. The number of mental health staff required by ADCRR's contracts with  
8 their vendors, and the number of actually filled positions, is abysmally low. *See, e.g.*,  
9 Doc. 1538-1 ¶ 25 (3/30/16 report) (“[E]ven if all authorized mental health staff positions  
10 were filled, staffing would likely still be inadequate. It is impossible to be completely  
11 certain about this, because as far as I can ascertain there has never been a time since the  
12 Stipulation went into effect when all authorized mental health staff positions were  
13 filled”).<sup>3</sup> Centurion's most recent data of August 2021 show only 74% (153.43) of 206.0  
14 contracted mental health positions filled. ADCRR0137140. I am especially concerned  
15 about vacancies among staff at prisons with high numbers of people in isolation or  
16 detention units, or at prisons that have the most SMI patients incarcerated and where there  
17 are supposed to be intensive mental health programs.

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26 <sup>3</sup> I spoke with Plaintiffs' expert Robert Joy about his planned analysis of the  
27 shortcomings in the quantity and allocation of health care staff, and mental health care  
28 staffing metrics, twice prior to his issuance of his October 9, 2021 report. I since reviewed  
his report, and in my opinion, his calculations, conclusions, and opinions regarding the  
needed quantities and types of mental health and psychiatric staff are sound.

Specifically, the data show:

**ASPC-Eyman:**

| Position               | Contract FTE | May FTE     | May % Filled | June FTE    | June % Filled | July FTE    | July % Filled | Aug FTE     | Aug % Filled |
|------------------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|--------------|
| Behavioral Health Tech | 4.00         | 3.00        | 75%          | 3.00        | 75%           | 4.00        | 100%          | 7.00        | 175%         |
| MH Lead                | 1.00         | 1.00        | 100%         | 1.00        | 100%          | 1.00        | 100%          | 1.00        | 100%         |
| MH Clerk               | 1.00         | 0.00        | 0%           | 0.00        | 0%            | 0.00        | 0%            | 0.00        | 0%           |
| MH Midlevel (NP/PA)    | 3.50         | 3.50        | 100%         | 3.50        | 100%          | 3.00        | 86%           | 4.00        | 114%         |
| MH RN                  | 2.00         | 0.90        | 45%          | 0.90        | 45%           | 0.90        | 45%           | 0.90        | 45%          |
| Psychiatrist           | 1.00         | 1.00        | 100%         | 1.00        | 100%          | 1.00        | 100%          | 1.00        | 100%         |
| Psychologist           | 3.00         | 1.00        | 33%          | 1.00        | 33%           | 1.00        | 33%           | 2.00        | 67%          |
| Psych Associate        | 13.00        | 5.80        | 45%          | 4.00        | 31%           | 5.00        | 38%           | 8.00        | 62%          |
| <b>TOTAL MH STAFF</b>  | <b>26.5</b>  | <b>16.2</b> | <b>57%</b>   | <b>14.4</b> | <b>51%</b>    | <b>15.9</b> | <b>56%</b>    | <b>23.9</b> | <b>84%</b>   |

**ASPC-Florence**

| Position               | Contract FTE | May FTE      | May % Filled | June FTE     | June % Filled | July FTE     | July % Filled | Aug FTE     | Aug % Filled |
|------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|---------------|-------------|--------------|
| Behavioral Health Tech | 4.00         | 4.00         | 100%         | 4.00         | 100%          | 4.00         | 100%          | 0.00        | 0%           |
| MH Lead                | 1.00         | 1.00         | 100%         | 1.00         | 100%          | 0.00         | 0%            | 0.00        | 0%           |
| MH Clerk               | 1.00         | 1.00         | 100%         | 1.00         | 100%          | 1.00         | 100%          | 1.00        | 100%         |
| MH Midlevel (NP/PA)    | 3.50         | 3.50         | 100%         | 3.50         | 100%          | 3.00         | 86%           | 3.00        | 86%          |
| Mental Health RN       | 1.00         | 0.80         | 80%          | 1.00         | 100%          | 1.00         | 100%          | 0.00        | 0%           |
| Psychiatrist           | 1.00         | 1.00         | 100%         | 1.00         | 100%          | 1.00         | 100%          | 1.00        | 100%         |
| Psychologist           | 3.00         | 0.90         | 30%          | 0.90         | 30%           | 0.90         | 30%           | 0.90        | 30%          |
| Psych Associate        | 8.00         | 5.00         | 63%          | 5.00         | 63%           | 5.00         | 63%           | 2.00        | 25%          |
| <b>TOTAL MH STAFF</b>  | <b>22.50</b> | <b>17.20</b> | <b>76%</b>   | <b>17.40</b> | <b>77%</b>    | <b>15.90</b> | <b>71%</b>    | <b>7.90</b> | <b>35%</b>   |

**ASPC-Lewis**

| Position               | Contract FTE | May FTE      | May % Filled | June FTE     | June % Filled | July FTE     | July % Filled | Aug FTE      | Aug % Filled |
|------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|--------------|
| Behavioral Health Tech | 4.00         | 2.00         | 50%          | 3.00         | 75%           | 3.00         | 75%           | 3.00         | 75%          |
| MH Lead                | 1.00         | 0.00         | 0%           | 0.00         | 0%            | 0.00         | 0%            | 0.00         | 0%           |
| MH Clerk               | 1.00         | 2.00         | 200%         | 1.00         | 100%          | 1.00         | 100%          | 1.00         | 100%         |
| MH Midlevel (NP/PA)    | 3.50         | 2.00         | 57%          | 3.00         | 86%           | 3.00         | 86%           | 3.00         | 86%          |
| Mental Health RN       | 2.00         | 1.00         | 50%          | 0.00         | 0%            | 0.00         | 0%            | 1.00         | 50%          |
| Psychiatrist           | 1.00         | 1.00         | 100%         | 1.00         | 100%          | 1.00         | 100%          | 1.00         | 100%         |
| Psychologist           | 3.00         | 3.00         | 100%         | 3.00         | 100%          | 3.00         | 100%          | 2.00         | 67%          |
| Psych Associate        | 12.00        | 10.25        | 85%          | 10.25        | 85%           | 10.25        | 85%           | 10.25        | 85%          |
| <b>TOTAL MH STAFF</b>  | <b>27.50</b> | <b>21.25</b> | <b>77%</b>   | <b>21.25</b> | <b>77%</b>    | <b>21.25</b> | <b>77%</b>    | <b>21.26</b> | <b>77%</b>   |

**ASPC-Phoenix**

| Position               | Contract FTE | May FTE      | May % Filled | June FTE     | June % Filled | July FTE     | July % Filled | Aug FTE      | Aug % Filled |
|------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|--------------|
| Behavioral Health Tech | 5.00         | 5.00         | 100%         | 5.00         | 100%          | 5.00         | 100%          | 2.00         | 40%          |
| Clinical Director      | 1.00         | 1.00         | 100%         | 1.00         | 100%          | 0.00         | 0%            | 0.00         | 0%           |
| MH Midlevel (NP/PA)    | 3.50         | 3.50         | 100%         | 3.50         | 100%          | 3.50         | 100%          | 3.50         | 100%         |
| Mental Health RN       | 15.80        | 6.30         | 40%          | 6.90         | 44%           | 6.00         | 38%           | 8.80         | 56%          |
| MH RN Charge           | 1.00         | 1.00         | 100%         | 1.00         | 100%          | 1.90         | 190%          | 0.90         | 90%          |
| Psychiatrist           | 1.00         | 1.00         | 100%         | 1.00         | 100%          | 1.00         | 100%          | 1.00         | 100%         |
| Psychologist           | 4.00         | 3.50         | 88%          | 3.50         | 88%           | 2.50         | 63%           | 2.50         | 63%          |
| Psych Associate        | 11.00        | 9.00         | 82%          | 11.00        | 100%          | 9.00         | 82%           | 9.00         | 82%          |
| <b>TOTAL MH STAFF</b>  | <b>42.30</b> | <b>31.18</b> | <b>74%</b>   | <b>33.78</b> | <b>80%</b>    | <b>29.78</b> | <b>70%</b>    | <b>28.58</b> | <b>68%</b>   |

**ASPC-Tucson**

| Position               | Contract FTE | May FTE      | May % Filled | June FTE     | June % Filled | July FTE     | July % Filled | Aug FTE      | Aug % Filled |
|------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|--------------|
| Behavioral Health Tech | 6.00         | 6.00         | 100%         | 6.00         | 100%          | 6.00         | 100%          | 4.00         | 67%          |
| MH Lead                | 1.00         | 1.00         | 100%         | 1.00         | 100%          | 1.00         | 100%          | 1.00         | 100%         |
| MH Clerk               | 1.00         | 1.00         | 100%         | 1.00         | 100%          | 1.00         | 100%          | 1.00         | 100%         |
| MH Midlevel (NP/PA)    | 3.50         | 3.50         | 100%         | 3.50         | 100%          | 3.50         | 100%          | 4.50         | 129%         |
| MH RN                  | 2.00         | 2.00         | 100%         | 2.00         | 100%          | 2.00         | 100%          | 2.00         | 100%         |
| Psychiatrist           | 1.00         | 0.00         | 0%           | 0.00         | 0%            | 0.00         | 0%            | 0.00         | 0%           |
| Psychologist           | 4.00         | 2.00         | 50%          | 4.00         | 100%          | 3.90         | 98%           | 3.90         | 98%          |
| Psych Associate        | 14.00        | 12.00        | 86%          | 11.00        | 79%           | 11.00        | 79%           | 11.00        | 79%          |
| <b>TOTAL MH STAFF</b>  | <b>32.50</b> | <b>27.50</b> | <b>85%</b>   | <b>28.50</b> | <b>88%</b>    | <b>28.40</b> | <b>87%</b>    | <b>27.40</b> | <b>84%</b>   |

(Sources: ADCRR00069737-39 (May-July 2021); ADCRR00137140 (August 2021))

21. The “mix” of staff is also critically important. In my 2013 report I noted the low level of psychiatrist staffing in the ADC mental health system. Doc. 1104-2 (Nov. 2013 report) at 12-14. In my 2016 expert declaration, I again detailed the dearth of mental health providers, especially at the psychiatrist physician level. Doc. 1538-1 at ¶ 18. This continues to be the case, unfortunately. There are very few psychiatrist physicians working in the system –there are only seven (7) psychiatrist full time equivalent (“FTE”) positions listed in the statewide contract. However, according to Centurion’s records, only two of those psychiatrist positions appear to be on-site (at Phoenix and Yuma), the others

1 are listed as practicing remotely via telepsychiatry. (ADCRR000069737). Centurion's  
2 staffing model instead relies upon the vast majority of psychiatric services being done by  
3 midlevel practitioners such as nurse practitioners, physician assistants, who are designated  
4 as "mental health midlevel" providers. *Id.* (showing 24 "Mental Health Midlevel"  
5 positions in the statewide contract). The issue that I encountered in the medical record  
6 review is that these patients are so incredibly complex, and because of that, the clinical  
7 presentations and treatment requirements often exceed the professional preparation of a  
8 nurse practitioner. Accordingly, at a minimum there needs to be on-site physician  
9 psychiatrist supervision of the mental health midlevel psychiatry staff, due to the  
10 complexity of the patients. As detailed in paragraph 18, these are literally the most  
11 complex psychiatry patients in the State of Arizona, as people with these serious  
12 symptoms are not found in the community. It is incumbent on Defendants to ensure that  
13 the midlevel practitioners are properly trained and supervised.

14 22. The majority of day-to-day mental health care is provided by psychological  
15 associates (some of whom are not licensed), behavioral health technicians, or even  
16 correctional officers.<sup>4</sup> Unfortunately, one disturbing pattern that I have seen repeatedly in  
17 medical records is that mental health staff without pharmacological training serve as de  
18 facto gatekeepers of patients' access to psychiatric prescribers, even when they describe  
19 concerning side effects or inefficacy of their medication. There are examples of this  
20 described later in this declaration.

21 23. In addition, shortages of other health care staff, such as nurses who screen  
22 Health Needs Requests filed by patients seeking mental health care, nurses who distribute  
23 medications to patients, and medical records staff, can negatively affect the delivery of

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24 \_\_\_\_\_  
25 <sup>4</sup> According to a report provided by Defendants on August 31, 2021, listing all  
26 Centurion mental health staff and their current licensure status, there are 14 psychology  
27 associates who are listed as not being licensed, including 4 psych associates at Eyman, 2  
28 at Florence, 3 at Lewis, 1 at Perryville, 2 at Phoenix, and 2 at Yuma. ADRR00046154-57.  
As noted in the charts above at Paragraph 19, for August 2021, that would mean that 50%  
of the 8 filled psych associate positions at Eyman were unlicensed, 100% of the 2 filled  
positions at Florence were unlicensed, and between a quarter and third of the psych  
associates at Phoenix and Lewis were unlicensed.

1 mental health services and treatment, even if those employees are not formally classified  
2 as mental health staff. And shortages and vacancies in custody staff will also adversely  
3 affect the delivery of mental health care: whether there are enough officers available to  
4 escort class members to mental health encounters (either at a clinic or an out-of-cell  
5 location in a housing unit), to work in clinics where telepsychiatry and counseling occurs,  
6 to provide security during group mental health services and programs, to properly monitor  
7 people placed on suicide or other mental health watches, and to properly supervise and  
8 monitor people incarcerated in isolation units who may be experiencing psychological  
9 decline due to the harsh conditions.

10 24. I reviewed Dr. Marc Stern's October 2, 2019 expert report to the Court.  
11 Doc. 3379. Dr. Stern made three recommendations about health care staffing: staffing  
12 levels need to be increased; the mix of staff (medical doctors / psychiatrists, mid-levels,  
13 nursing staff) should be reconfigured so that the bulk of the work is not pushed on to  
14 lower-level staff; and salaries may need to be raised to fill positions. Doc. 3379 at 95-101.

15 25. In recent depositions, both Centurion and ADCRR mental health leadership  
16 confirmed the existence of chronic and significant mental health staffing shortages.  
17 Dr. Stefanie Platt, who was Centurion's Regional Director of Mental Health for Arizona  
18 until late July 2021, testified that she left her position because "I felt as though I didn't  
19 have the resources, support, or communication that I needed to do my job in the manner  
20 which I saw fit."<sup>5</sup> She added:

21 We had a strong issue with needing more staff to fulfill the obligations  
22 within the court order as well as provide the care that we wanted to. We  
23 were [...] unable at the time to give monetary incentive for retention, and  
retention was a huge problem.<sup>6</sup>

24 Asked why retention was a problem, she testified: "I believe morale was very low. People  
25 reported morale to be very low. They indicated feeling overworked and undervalued  
26 within the global system."<sup>7</sup>

27 <sup>5</sup> 10/15/21 Deposition Transcript of Dr. Stefanie Platt, 17:11-15.

28 <sup>6</sup> *Id.* 18:12-15-18.

<sup>7</sup> *Id.*, 31:4-11.

1           26. Dr. Platt further testified that “every individual on [Centurion’s] regional  
2 mental health team,” including the Regional Director of Psychiatry Dr. Antonio Carr,  
3 expressed the view that there was not enough mental health staff working in the prisons.<sup>8</sup>  
4 She testified that an internal Centurion study concluded that there was insufficient mental  
5 health staff to comply with the Court’s order setting forth presumptive minimum durations  
6 of ten and thirty minutes for mental health encounters; “[t]here was not enough staff to be  
7 able to see the patients specifically as indicated for those periods of time.”<sup>9</sup> She also  
8 testified that mental health staff “were seeing patients within time frame and parameters  
9 and often times did not feel as though they had enough time allotted to them to do more --  
10 spend more ample time doing these, creating comprehensive treatment plans.”<sup>10</sup>

11           27. Dr. Platt testified that turnover among mental health staff prevented the  
12 development of therapeutic trusting relationships between clinicians and patients.<sup>11</sup> She  
13 expressed this view to others in Centurion leadership, including Dr. Antonio Carr, the  
14 Regional Director of Psychiatry, and Tom Dolan, the Vice President of Operations for  
15 Arizona, and “it was shared by everybody that I spoke to in the mental health team.”<sup>12</sup>

16           28. Dr. Bobbie Pennington-Stallcup is ADCRR’s Mental Health Program  
17 Director. In her October 15, 2021 deposition, she described a meeting she held with  
18 Centurion’s mental health staff at the Eyman prison in the summer of 2021, where staff  
19 expressed concern “that there was not enough staff at that time to get their job done.”<sup>13</sup>  
20 Dr. Stallcup testified that she shared that concern.<sup>14</sup>

21           29. In her deposition, Dr. Stallcup also confirmed that in an August 27, 2020  
22 email to defendant Larry Gann and Centurion’s Tom Dolan, she listed mental health staff  
23 vacancies at Eyman, Florence, Lewis, Perryville, Phoenix, Tucson, and Yuma, and wrote,  
24

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25           <sup>8</sup> *Id.*, 26:24-27:9.

26           <sup>9</sup> *Id.*, 24:1-25:17.

27           <sup>10</sup> *Id.*, 96:20-24.

28           <sup>11</sup> *Id.*, 62:15-20.

<sup>12</sup> *Id.*, 62:21-63:9.

<sup>13</sup> 10/15/21 Deposition of Dr. Bobbie Pennington-Stallcup, 7:14-8:8.

<sup>14</sup> *Id.*, 8:9-13.



1 “There are significant vacancies in clinical mental health staff who are primarily  
2 responsible for providing the behavioral health contacts required by the courts in the  
3 March 11, 2020 order, the psychologists and the psychology associates.”<sup>15</sup> She testified  
4 that she did not recall if she ever received a response from Mr. Gann or Mr. Dolan.<sup>16</sup>

5 30. Dr. Stallcup also testified that she sent a November 12, 2020 email to Mr.  
6 Gann, Mr. Dolan, and Dr. Platt, in which she stated that “The quality of care being  
7 provided is not adequate as PMs 80, 86, and 95 were failed the last two months in row at  
8 Eyman.” Dr. Stallcup confirmed that she believed the quality of care being provided at  
9 Eyman at that time was inadequate.<sup>17</sup>

10 31. At her deposition, Dr. Stallcup was shown an August 2021 staffing  
11 document (ADCRR00137140), which showed no mental health staff at all at the Douglas  
12 prison, and vacancies in mental health staffing at Eyman, Florence, Lewis, Perryville,  
13 Phoenix, Tucson, and Yuma. Dr. Stallcup testified that these staffing vacancies concern  
14 her, and that she is not satisfied with the level of mental health staffing as reflected in the  
15 August 2021 document.<sup>18</sup>

16 32. This sworn testimony by Centurion and ADCRR mental health leadership  
17 reinforces my opinion that unless and until these staffing shortfalls are addressed,  
18 incarcerated people with mental illness will continue to suffer needlessly – often resulting  
19 in permanent psychological trauma and suffering, physical disfigurement due to profound  
20 acts of self-harm and self-injurious behavior, and in the most tragic of outcomes, death by  
21 suicide. It is my opinion that the other systemic deficiencies set forth below are rooted, in  
22 whole or in part, in ADCRR’s chronically inadequate health care staffing.

23  
24 \_\_\_\_\_  
25 <sup>15</sup> *Id.*, 21:20-23:13 (Deposition Exhibit 11).

26 <sup>16</sup> *Id.*, 23:14-18.

27 <sup>17</sup> *Id.*, 24:5-26:5 (Deposition Exhibit 12). PM 80 requires that patients classified as  
28 MH 3A be seen at least every 30 days by a mental health clinician. PM 86 pertains to  
follow-up of patients who have recently discontinued psychotropic medications. PM 95  
pertains to removal of patients from suicide watch and follow-up of patients who have  
recently been removed from suicide watch.

<sup>18</sup> *Id.*, 28:13-31:6.

1           **B. Opinion: Systemic Problems in the Delivery of Mental Health Care Continue**  
2           **From The Filing of This Case**

3           33. My most recent observations and review of the documents confirms that the  
4 systemic deficiencies that I have repeatedly brought to the Court's attention since 2013  
5 unfortunately persist to this day, even though Defendants have now had three different  
6 contracted health care vendors.<sup>19</sup> These problems include delays in the provision of  
7 mental health care and the outright failure to provide mental health care; a lack of access  
8 to intensive inpatient mental health care for the most profoundly mentally ill patients;  
9 brief, non-confidential, and superficial contacts between mentally ill people and staff;  
10 inadequate treatment plans; a failure to coordinate psychiatric and psychology staff in  
11 treatment plans; a failure of collaboration between medical and psychiatric providers to  
12 treat complex patients; a failure to ensure effective communications with people who do  
13 not speak English and/or people with disabilities in therapeutic encounters; a failure to  
14 properly administer, monitor, and manage psychotropic medications and their potential  
15 side effects; a failure to mitigate and address acts of self-harm; inappropriate uses of force  
16 on seriously mentally ill people; and inappropriate and prolonged uses of isolation on  
17 people with mental illness. As a result, patients remain highly symptomatic, suffer great  
18 psychological torment, and oftentimes continue to engage in acts of self-injurious  
19 behavior, or most tragically, die by suicide. I address these systemic problems in turn.

20           **1. Opinion: ADCRR's Chronic Lack of Staffing Leads to an Inability to**  
21           **Provide Adequate Mental Health Care**

22           **a. Delays and Failure to Provide Adequate Mental Health Treatment**

23           34. When an incarcerated person requests mental health care, it is of paramount  
24 importance that their concerns are addressed in a timely manner. Similarly, patients need  
25 to be seen on a regular basis for therapeutic encounters and medication management.  
26

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27           <sup>19</sup> I concur in Dr. Stern's conclusion that privatization of health care in the prisons  
28 to be carried out by for-profit companies creates an unnecessary barrier to the State  
providing minimally adequate health care, including mental health care.

1           35. For example, when I was at ASPC-Eyman, I interviewed [REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
2 [REDACTED] at his cell-front. He complained of experiencing severe anxiety, depression and  
3 auditory hallucinations. He said his auditory hallucinations “make me want to curl up in a  
4 ball and scream” and “I feel like I’m going insane.” He went on to state that he’s  
5 submitted numerous HNRs about his symptoms and wished to change medications but has  
6 not receive a response. A review of his record revealed that he submitted an HNR on  
7 8/28/21 stating “who can I talk to about getting my meds changed?” His HNR was  
8 screened by a Registered Nurse the next day who wrote that Mr. [REDACTED] was experiencing  
9 “[i]neffective coping.” He finally saw a “mental health midlevel” staff person on 9/8/21.  
10 His medications were the antipsychotic, Abilify, at 15 mg daily and Vistaril. He was  
11 prescribed the antidepressant, Remeron, at 15 mg every evening. Other examples of  
12 delays in care include [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (Eyman); [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
13 (Tucson); [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (Tucson). *See Exhibit 2.*

14           36. The mortality review conducted by ADCRR after the death by suicide in  
15 [REDACTED] of [REDACTED]-year-old [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] found that “delay in access to  
16 care” was a contributing cause of his suicide. My review concluded that the significant  
17 delays in psychiatric care after he reported severe psychiatric symptoms fell far below the  
18 standard of care. *See Exhibit 3.*





19           37. A key component of mental health care for seriously mentally ill people,  
20 especially those in institutional or carceral settings, is group therapy and programming. As  
21 I noted in my November 2013 report,

22           An adequate correctional mental health care system must provide a full  
23 range of treatment modalities; a system that relies primarily or exclusively  
24 on medication does not provide an acceptable level of care. It is my opinion  
25 that the ADC mental health care system relies almost exclusively on  
26 medication (which it fails to provide reliably or appropriately), and does not  
27 provide an appropriate level of non-medication mental health programming.  
I spent eight full weekdays inspecting seven ADC prison complexes,  
including the units where the most severely mentally ill prisoners are  
housed. At every facility, I was surprised to see little or no mental health  
programming. ...This is an extraordinary experience that I do not recall  
having in any other prison system.”





28 Doc. 1104-2 (Nov. 2013 report) at 37-38.

1 38. Group mental health programs are an important component of the treatment  
 2 modality for populations of people with mental illness, behavior disorders, or serious  
 3 mental health symptoms. They are an incredibly effective tool because it is not just a one-  
 4 on-one therapy session, but rather the individual has a whole group of other people who  
 5 give feedback and point things out, and the patient can hear others' experiences and not  
 6 feel so isolated or alone. It is powerful for people to get feedback from their peers, and  
 7 learn to develop empathy for their peers.

8 39. This failure to have group mental health care hasn't changed. Many people I  
 9 spoke to who had recently been in a behavioral management unit at Florence Kasson  
 10 (which closed on September 7, 2021, before my tours), reported that out-of-cell groups  
 11 had been cancelled for a year and a half, in part because ADCRR used the unit to isolate  
 12 non-mentally ill people who were positive for or exposed to COVID-19. Defendants'  
 13 records show programs cancelled due to COVID-19 **and** "staffing levels at Kasson:  
 14

|  |   |                        |
|--|---|------------------------|
| Time<br>0600   | Date<br>04/18/2020  | Location<br>CB6-Kasson |
| <b>Summary</b>   |   |                        |
| Summary<br>On 04/18/2020 COIII program classes, mental health classes and SMI unstructured time were cancelled for the week due to the COVID-19 pandemic. All affected OOC forms will reflect the cancellations and recreation will continue as scheduled.   |   |                        |
| Employee's Signature<br>  | Title<br> |                        |
| <b>Action Taken</b>  |   |                        |
| Comments/Action Taken<br>COIII program classes, mental health classes and SMI unstructured time were cancelled due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The hours required to meet the PVS standard with the staffing levels at Kasson are not possible with the days left of the week in order for the activities to be made-up. |   |                        |
| Employee's Signature<br>  | Title<br> |                        |

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| Summary  |   |
|--|---|
| Summary<br>On 06/19/2021 COIII program classes, mental health classes and SMI unstructured time were cancelled for the week due to the COVID-19 pandemic. All affected OOC forms will reflect the cancellations and recreation will continue as scheduled.<br>Recreation is being offered in 10x10 recreation enclosures to all inmates. |   |
| Employee's Signature    | Title  |
| Action Taken   |   |
| Comments/Action Taken<br>COIII program classes, mental health classes and SMI unstructured time were cancelled due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The hours required to meet the PVS standard with the staffing levels at Kasson are not be possible with the days left of the week in order for the activities to be made-up.                |   |
| Employee's Signature    | Title   |

Source: ADCRR00054287, 4/18/20; ADCRR00055785, 6/19/21.

40. On September 8, 2021, at ASPC-Eyman, I spoke with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] who is diagnosed with schizophrenia and is housed in a maximum custody behavioral management unit designated for people with serious mental illness. He complained that there was no group mental health programming. Of note, his medical record has a discrepancy – one entry from 8/24/21 says he attended group therapy while another that same date says that group programming was cancelled due to staffing shortages. *See Exhibit 2.*

41. Multiple other people at Eyman reported there had not been any groups until a week or two before my visit. A review of medical records of class members show that week after week group therapy sessions were “cancelled due to Centurion staff shortage.” *See, e.g.* [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (8/31/21 15:01 note; 8/24/21 16:34 note); [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (8/31/21 15:14 note; 8/24/21 16:46 note).

42. In my 2013 report, I noted that some mental health groups were being run by persons with little or no mental health training. Doc. 1104-2 at 38 (citing testimony that some groups were run by psych techs, who may have no formal education beyond a high school diploma). Their titles are now “Behavioral Health Techs” but to the extent

1 there are group programs happening, that's who leads them. It is my opinion that mental  
2 health groups should be led and coordinated – at a minimum – by licensed masters' level  
3 psychology associates.

4 43. People at Perryville Lumley's BMU and Eyman Browning's BMU – both  
5 housing units supposedly designated for people classified SMI –reported that to the extent  
6 there were any out of cell group therapy or programming, it was led by BHTs or custody  
7 officers, and often consisted of watching DVDs of TV shows and movies.

8 **b. Access to Inpatient Intensive Mental Health Care**

9 44. An adequate correctional mental health system must provide a full  
10 continuum of care - from outpatient counseling and medication, through inpatient  
11 hospitalization. It is entirely foreseeable that the most severely mentally ill prisoners will  
12 require an inpatient level of care, and such care must be readily available.

13 45. I noted in 2013 that “ADC lacks a reliable system to ensure that prisoners  
14 needing a higher level of mental health care are transferred in a timely fashion to  
15 appropriate facilities.” Doc. 1104-2 at p. 40. I again described this in 2016. Doc. 1538-1 at  
16 86-87. And it continues today. This includes people who need to be transferred to ASPC-  
17 Phoenix, the prison facility located on the campus of the Arizona State Hospital, that  
18 incarcerates male class members with the highest mental health acuity scores (MH-4 and  
19 MH-5). During my inspection tours, I saw numerous patients who needed an inpatient  
20 level of care, but had not been transferred to such a placement.

21 46. When I visited ASPC-Phoenix on September 23, 2021, I was struck by how  
22 empty the intensive mental health units at Flamenco and Baker Units were. The Baker  
23 Unit, which historically was where some of the most profoundly mentally ill max custody  
24 level prisoners are housed, including while on suicide watch, was mainly filled with  
25 people on quarantine or isolation due to COVID-19 exposure or infection. Only one-third  
26 of the inpatient mental health beds in the prison were occupied that day, as seen below:

27 //

28 //

| Unit                   | Capacity   | 9/23/21 Pop.    | % Beds Filled |
|------------------------|------------|-----------------|---------------|
| Baker Ward             | 48         | 24              | 50%           |
| Flamenco – Ida Ward    | 25         | 14              | 56%           |
| Flamenco – Ida Watch   | 15         | 0 <sup>20</sup> | 0%            |
| Flamenco – John PS     | 30         | 9               | 30%           |
| Flamenco – King Ward   | 35         | 9               | 26%           |
| Flamenco – George Ward | 20         | 7               | 35%           |
| <b>All MH-5 Beds</b>   | <b>173</b> | <b>63</b>       | <b>36%</b>    |

Source:

[https://corrections.az.gov/sites/default/files/DAILY\\_COUNT/Sept2021/09232021\\_count\\_sheet.pdf](https://corrections.az.gov/sites/default/files/DAILY_COUNT/Sept2021/09232021_count_sheet.pdf)

47. Yet there were many people who I observed at other prisons who are desperately in need of an inpatient level of care, but inexplicably had not been transferred to Phoenix. For example, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] is SMI and appeared multiple times on ADCRR's self-harm logs in 2021 for self-injurious behavior while housed at Florence-Kasson Unit. He has past diagnoses of paranoid schizophrenia and anxiety, but currently has a diagnosis of unspecified bipolar disorder. He was in the mental health watch unit at Eyman-Browning when I visited on September 8, 2021. He was on continuous watch, naked except for a suicide blanket wrapped around his waist, and was laying on the cement floor by the door. He was extremely disheveled and reported experiencing command hallucinations ordering him to hurt himself. Mr. [REDACTED] is a patient I interviewed for my 2013 report (*see* p. PRSN-PS 00186 of Nov. 2013 report) and his appalling mistreatment continues to this day.

48. Mr. [REDACTED]'s medical record documents that in recent months, he has shown an escalating and extremely dangerous pattern of self-harm, which has not been appropriately recognized or responded to by mental health staff. On 6/28/2021 there was a crisis response when Mr. [REDACTED] cut himself on the arm using a "small spring" from his

<sup>20</sup> [REDACTED]

1 water bottle. Later he was agitated and yelling at staff. On follow-up on 6/29/2021, the  
2 patient endorsed “10/10” on urges to harm himself. He then spit on the social worker,  
3 leading to a throw shield being placed in front of his cell. The psychiatric provider on  
4 6/30/2021 documented a “non-clinical contact note” due to the patient’s refusal to attend  
5 the appointment; the provider visited his cell to confirm refusal of appointment. The  
6 record contains no record of the psychiatric provider’s impressions given the recent “ICS”  
7 activation and the patient’s escalating behavior.

8 49. On 7/13/2021 Mr. [REDACTED] cut himself three times on the left forearm using a  
9 piece of metal. A follow up mental health visit on 7/14/2021 documented suicidal  
10 ideation. Further ICS responses were called on 7/17/2021, 7/18/2021 (three times),  
11 7/21/2021, 7/26/2021, 7/29/2021, and 8/2/2021, all for continued self-harm. On 7/18/2021  
12 Mr. [REDACTED] re-opened an old scar on the left forearm which was “2 inches in length and  
13 about 1/8-1/4 deep (the depth of the scar mainly).” A follow-up ICS response noted him  
14 saying he may cut again later that night, which he subsequently did with a “small rock”.

15 50. On 7/26/2021 Mr. [REDACTED] was found hanging in his cell with both feet off  
16 the ground. He was taken down by officers and found breathing, but not responding. After  
17 suicide watch on 8/2/2021, Mr. [REDACTED] was agitated toward staff. Weeks later, on  
18 8/17/2021, he was seen by a psychiatric prescribing provider who only documented “non-  
19 clinical provider notes” without adequate assessment, and renewed existing medications.  
20 The 8/17/2021 note contains no documentation of an assessment in light of Mr. [REDACTED],  
21 recent serious self-harm by hanging. He remained in an “outpatient-specialized MH  
22 program,” but considering his serious and escalating self-harm, this is an inappropriate  
23 level of care.

24 51. This patient is receiving highly inadequate and dangerously deficient care.  
25 He has engaged in self-harm on multiple occasions leading to crisis response by staff.  
26 Despite the escalating severity of his self-harm, he did not receive appropriate psychiatric  
27 assessment or change in treatment, with the result that his self-harming behavior  
28 continued. His escalating behavior led finally to him being found hanging, feet off the



1 ground, and unconscious, which could well have resulted in his death. Furthermore, all  
2 contact by a psychiatric provider was logged as “non-clinical contact note,” despite the  
3 provider having seen the patient. In these notes, there was no mention of his escalating  
4 self-harm or suicide attempt. Rather, the assessment and diagnosis sections of the notes  
5 were left blank, with an inadequate plan. He is at very grave risk of serious injury or  
6 death. He should be urgently transferred to an inpatient hospital setting.

7 52. Another example is [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] who was on suicide watch at  
8 ASPC-Eyman on September 8, 2021. I spoke with Mr. [REDACTED] in a confidential setting.  
9 He has a long history of psychiatric impairments and an extensive history of self-injurious  
10 behaviors and suicide attempts. He cuts himself as a way of relieving stress. At the time of  
11 my interview, he informed me that he was previously treated with the mood stabilizer,  
12 Trileptal, which significantly reduced his incidence of cutting. He stated that he was told  
13 by ADC staff that he couldn’t be on Trileptal because “inmates abuse it.” He recently had  
14 a serious incident of cutting himself which required his being sent to an outside hospital.  
15 He had numerous bandages on his arms and legs, and reported that he was hospitalized  
16 after losing a significant amount of blood after cutting near his femoral artery. I was so  
17 concerned about his risk of further injury or death by suicide, that I requested that  
18 Plaintiffs’ counsel notify attorneys for ADCRR and Centurion that evening of Mr.  
19 [REDACTED]’s need to be immediately transferred to inpatient mental health care and  
20 evaluation of his medication by a psychiatrist. Plaintiffs’ counsel sent an email that night  
21 at my direction, stating:

22 Mr. [REDACTED] harmed himself again yesterday upon arriving to Browning,  
23 despite [REDACTED] on a constant watch. Mr. [REDACTED] reports that in the past  
24 other providers had diagnosed him with [REDACTED] mania and psychosis; his  
25 medical record shows that in November 2018, his active diagnosis was  
26 changed to borderline personality disorder. He is prescribed 40 mg QD of  
27 Pantoprazole. Mr. [REDACTED] last saw “psychiatry midlevel” staff on 7/7/21,  
28 when he asked for [REDACTED] because it had helped him in the past with his  
urges to hurt himself. The treating clinician wrote that he reported mood  
swings, anxiety at a level of 7, depression at 7, auditory and visual  
hallucinations, but she wrote that she would not prescribe it because  
Trileptal is not formulary and not FDA approved for his diagnosis of  
borderline personality disorder. His medical record shows that the last time

1 he was evaluated by a psychiatrist (M.D.) was 11/21/18 via telemedicine;  
2 and he was seen on July 2017 in person by a psychiatrist.

3 9/8/21 Email from C. Kendrick to Defendants' Counsel, "Patients in Acute Need of  
4 Psychiatrist Reevaluation and Higher Levels of Care".

5 53. Defendants disregarded my warning and did not refer him to a prescribing  
6 psychiatrist, nor evaluate him for transfer to ASPC-Phoenix. Of note, he had a new  
7 incident of self-injury on 9/14/21, one week after I notified Defendants and their  
8 attorneys. At that time, he reopened a partially healing wound. A very inadequate  
9 treatment plan was prepared by a psych associate the next day that failed to mention  
10 anything about possible medication modification options. The complexity of this case  
11 clearly exceeds the skills of a psych associate, and represents extremely poor care. Mr.  
12 [REDACTED] needs to be transferred to a higher level of care and be thoroughly evaluated for  
13 psychotropic medications.

14 54. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] is another patient who has been able to hurt  
15 himself repeatedly while on suicide watch. I interviewed Mr. [REDACTED] in a confidential  
16 setting at Browning's mental health watch unit. He is a 32-year-old man with numerous  
17 hospitalizations for self-injurious behavior, including cutting open his abdominal cavity in  
18 2019, and previously attempting to cut his own throat. Mr. [REDACTED] informed me that he  
19 experiences visual hallucinations and occasionally auditory hallucinations. His current  
20 mental health diagnosis is Schizoaffective Disorder, bipolar type. He was moved from  
21 Kasson MHW to Browning on September 7, 2021, the day before our interview. His  
22 medical record shows that he had been most recently hospitalized on September 4, 2021,  
23 after cutting a 7-inch long by one-inch-deep laceration to his right arm, swallowing three  
24 razor blades, and inserting three spork handles into his abdominal scar – *all while on*  
25 *continuous watch at Kasson*. He was also hospitalized on August 5, 2021, after  
26 swallowing foreign bodies while on continuous watch at Kasson. On July 14, 2021, the  
27 "psychiatry midlevel" staff wrote that "Patient does not respond to medications and  
28 continues to self-harm regardless of therapy and medication interventions," but there is no

1 indication that he has been evaluated for transfer to inpatient mental health care at  
2 Phoenix. Mr. [REDACTED] is another patient for whom I am extremely concerned, and at my  
3 direction, counsel for Plaintiffs contacted ADC's and Centurion's attorneys to request that  
4 he be evaluated without further delay for transfer to ASPC-Phoenix. As of October 1,  
5 2021 (the last date I reviewed his record), he was still at Eyman.

6 55. The reason for this disconnect and this practice of keeping the inpatient  
7 population at ASPC-Phoenix so low is not explicitly stated by ADCRR or Centurion, but  
8 it is my opinion that it is rooted in the limited number of mental health staff contracted to  
9 work and who actually work at ASPC-Phoenix – these patients require very frequent and  
10 ongoing treatment; to the extent that when there are vacancies in mental health staff as at  
11 Paragraph 19, there are parallel vacancies in the number of filled beds.

12 56. Similarly at Perryville, when I visited the inpatient treatment mental health  
13 unit on September 10, 2021, only 7 of 16 beds were occupied.<sup>21</sup> I spoke with women who  
14 had been moved to general population or mental health step-down units who reported that  
15 while they felt they had received adequate treatment in the inpatient facility, they did not  
16 feel stable enough to leave, and history had proven that they would decompensate in  
17 general population and cycle back to the more intensive mental health care units. *See*, for  
18 example, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] in Exhibit 2. There are other examples of patients  
19 who clearly need a higher level of care than they are receiving. For example, both the  
20 mortality review and the psychology autopsy following the suicide of [REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
21 [REDACTED] concluded that more timely access to a residential level of care would have been  
22 helpful to Ms. [REDACTED] *See* Exhibit 3.

### 23 c. Brief and Superficial Contacts with Mental Health Care Staff

24 57. In his October 2019 report, the Court's expert, Marc Stern, M.D., identified  
25 the issue of "very short mental health visits (some as short as 5, 3, or 2 minutes)." Doc.  
26 3379 at 28. Dr. Stern concluded that "some of the short visits are too short to be clinically

27 \_\_\_\_\_  
28 <sup>21</sup> *See* [https://corrections.az.gov/sites/default/files/DAILY\\_COUNT/Sept2021/09102021\\_count\\_sheet.pdf](https://corrections.az.gov/sites/default/files/DAILY_COUNT/Sept2021/09102021_count_sheet.pdf).

1 effective, and in the context of the cases, place patients at significant risk of substantial  
2 harm.” Doc. 3379 at 31. He further concluded that “care delivered during many of these  
3 short visits was not safe.” Doc. 3379 at 32 n. 24. Having reviewed a number of very short  
4 mental health encounters with ADC prisoners, I agree with Dr. Stern’s conclusions.

5         58. Mental health diagnosis and treatment take time. A meaningful encounter  
6 with a patient with mental illness requires documentation of their subjective experience of  
7 their illness since the last encounter. The clinician must document the course of treatment  
8 since the last encounter, including responses to medications and/or therapy and any side  
9 effects from the medications, and perform a comprehensive mental status examination as  
10 well as a safety check about potential self-harm and harm to others. Finally, the clinician  
11 should make a diagnosis and a plan for further treatment.

12         59. Mental health professionals interact with patients for a variety of purposes.  
13 But one indispensable task the professional must carry out in *every* encounter is a  
14 meaningful assessment of the patient’s condition and prognosis, including any risk of  
15 harm to the patient. This is particularly critical when the patient has already been  
16 identified as someone at risk of self-harm or suicide.

17         60. It is simply not possible to assess a patient and determine their risk of self-  
18 harm or suicide in an encounter lasting five, three, or two minutes. Such an assessment  
19 requires more than literally “seeing” a patient; it first requires establishing a therapeutic  
20 relationship. Only after this relationship is established is a mental health clinician able to  
21 effectively assess the patient. This is especially important when a clinician must evaluate a  
22 patient’s risk of self-harm or suicide, or, as is the case in ADC, when there is little  
23 continuity or turnover, and the patient is seen by different mental health staff from day to  
24 day. For example, the psych autopsy for the suicide of ██████████ ██████ notes that he “never  
25 had more than three contacts with the same psychiatric provider due to being transferred  
26 to other complexes” (*see* Exhibit 3).<sup>22</sup>

27  
28         <sup>22</sup> Dr. Leonel Urdaneta, a psychiatrist who was Director of Psychiatry for Corizon

1           61. Dr. Stern used “10 minutes or more as an acceptable visit length” for PMs  
2 91, 94, and 95, all of which involve “management of patients during or after placement on  
3 watch (due to acute psychotic or suicidal states).” Doc. 3379 at 29, 32. I concur with Dr.  
4 Stern, it is my opinion that the absolute minimum permissible length of an encounter to  
5 determine a patient’s risk of self-harm or suicide is **ten minutes**.<sup>23</sup>

6           62. Dr. Stern writes that “I would expect encounters in the non-acute setting  
7 when chronic care is being provided to generally be longer (in the range of 30 to 60  
8 minutes) than those in the acute watch-related setting when very narrowly focused care is  
9 being provided.” Doc. 3379 at 32 n. 25. I agree with Dr. Stern. Meaningful mental health  
10 treatment requires establishing a therapeutic relationship, evaluating the patient including  
11 assessing their risk for self-harm, arriving at a diagnostic assessment, assessing the  
12 effectiveness of previous treatment strategies, and providing the most efficacious  
13 treatment possible. It is difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish these goals in less than  
14 30 minutes. Accordingly, it is my opinion that **30 minutes** is the minimum acceptable  
15 duration for the mental health encounters required by PM 73, 74, 76, 78, and 80-90.

16           63. In its March 11, 2020 order, the Court established a presumptive minimum  
17 length of ten minutes for mental health encounters pursuant to what it called “watch-  
18 related PMs:” PMs 91, 94, and 95. The Court further established a presumptive minimum  
19 length of thirty minutes for mental health encounters pursuant to what it called “non-  
20 watch-related PMs:” PMs 73, 74, 76, 78, and 80-90. Doc. 3518. However, dangerously  
21 brief encounters continued notwithstanding the Court’s order. In my declaration of August  
22 14, 2020, I described a number of patient encounters that were so brief and superficial as  
23 to place the patient at a significant risk of serious harm:  
24

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25 (ADC’s previous health care provider) in Arizona between 2017 and 2019, testified that it  
26 is not possible to assess a patient’s risk of suicide in a cell-front encounter lasting five,  
27 three, or two minutes. Deposition of Leonel Urdaneta, M.D., December 10, 2019, Doc.  
28 3476-1, pp. 18-19, 68-69.

<sup>23</sup> Ten minutes is extremely conservative. By way of comparison, the Illinois  
Department of Corrections requires that daily mental health contacts with persons on  
watch “shall be at least 15-20 minutes in length per person.” Doc. 3511 at 3-4.

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- [REDACTED] (PM 80, Perryville, April 2020 CGAR, April 7, 2020): This was a **minute** meeting. The documentation was extremely terse with a majority of it being computer generated. The patient was currently being prescribed two psychotropic medications, Fluoxetine and Clonidine. No mention was ever made about these medications. There was also no mention about the patient's depression and anxiety. The plan was "continue medications." No mention of psychotherapy, psycho-education, or any other types of therapeutic interventions.
  - [REDACTED] (PM 80, Perryville, April 2020 CGAR, April 20, 2020): This was a **minute** meeting due to the patient allegedly not wanting to stay longer. The documentation regarding the visit was extremely terse with no meaningful interactions occurring. Certainly, no counseling occurred. Again, most of the documentation was computer generated.
  - [REDACTED] (PM 80, Perryville, April 2020 CGAR, April 9, 2020): This was a **minute** interview because the patient allegedly refused a longer session. During this one-minute interview a computer-generated mental status exam was completed. The assessment portion of this 1-minute interview stated "IM denies SI/HI/command AVH [suicidal ideation/homicidal ideation/command auditory-visual hallucinations]. IM guarded but was observed pleasant with other staff and generally stable." The patient is actually prescribed an antipsychotic, an antidepressant and a mood stabilizing medication. No mention was made about the three psychotropic medications she was prescribed. The fact that the patient was noted to be "guarded" could be due to paranoia, an insidious onset of a serious mood episode or the fact that she actually was psychotic. This is an example of a completely inadequate mental health visit and left the patient at risk for serious harm. If a patient refuses to talk, or wishes to terminate the interview after one or two minutes, it is not acceptable for the clinician to simply walk away. The clinician should make repeated efforts to engage with the patient and encourage her to talk. And even if the patient refuses to talk, the clinician is still required to assess her, including evaluating the patient's risk for self-harm or suicide. This can be accomplished in a number of ways, including observing the patient's hygiene; the cleanliness of the cell; and the patient's demeanor, such as whether she is displaying overt signs of mental illness such as posturing or responding to internal stimuli. These essential steps cannot be performed in a visit lasting one or two minutes.
  - [REDACTED] (PM 80, Perryville, April 2020 CGAR, April 21, 2020): This was a **minute** meeting that was as vacuous as the encounters described above. Of note, this patient was prescribed the antipsychotic Geodon. This medication requires that it be administered with food in order to ensure proper absorption. This is not an esoteric fact, but rather a commonly known issue surrounding the use of Geodon in correctional settings. No questions were brought up about the patient taking this medication with food. This fact alone places the patient at serious risk of harm.
  - [REDACTED] (PM 80, Perryville, April 2020 CGAR, April 23, 2020): This was a **minute** interview. Of note, the patient is a 70-year-old female, housed in the infirmary, with a stated complaint of "patient is experiencing psychiatric destabilization to the extent **she is unable to respond**" (**emphasis added.**) The clinician documented that the patient was communicating with nonverbal responses. Even with the patient unable to

1 give verbal responses, the clinician somehow divined that the patient was  
 2 not experiencing psychotic symptoms or suicidal/homicidal ideations. The  
 3 patient was also prescribed the antipsychotic Olanzapine 15mg every  
 4 morning. She was also receiving opiate pain relievers. No mention was  
 5 made of the possibility that these very powerful medications could be  
 contributing to the patient's inability to respond. This clinical visit is  
 completely inadequate and places the 70-year-old patient at serious risk of  
 harm. Of note, this patient should be seen regularly by a psychiatrist,  
 preferably a neuro-psychiatrist.

- 6 • [REDACTED] (PM 80, Yuma, May 2020 CGAR, May 7, 2020): This was a **four-**  
 7 interview. The patient suffers from a mood and psychotic disorder  
 8 for which he is prescribed an antipsychotic and an antidepressant. The  
 9 overall visit was very superficial given the severity of the patient's  
 10 psychiatric issues. The writer stated that the patient denies S/H ideations,  
 11 hallucinations, issues with depression and anxiety, and issues with eating  
 12 and sleeping. No inquiry was made about the patient's medications  
 13 including efficacy, side effects or compliance. The superficial nature of this  
 14 encounter places the patient at risk of harm, especially medication-related  
 15 problems.
- 16 • [REDACTED] (PM 80, Yuma, May 2020 CGAR, May 12, 2020): This was a  
 17 **minute** encounter with a patient who is diagnosed with Bipolar  
 18 Disorder and is prescribed an antidepressant and antipsychotic. The clinician  
 19 documented the patient denies S/H ideation and hallucinations. A computer-  
 20 generated mental status exam was completed even though the patient  
 21 "refused services." No documentation about the status of the patient's  
 22 Bipolar Disorder was present. Also, there was no mention about the  
 medications. It is possible that the refusal to be seen reflects undertreated  
 Bipolar Disorder. Lastly, the stated plan was "will be seen W/I 30 days or  
 HNR request." This is an extremely inadequate clinical encounter.
- 23 • [REDACTED] (PM 94, Phoenix, April 2020 CGAR, April 12, 2020): This is a  
 24 **minute** encounter with a patient on suicide watch who is diagnosed  
 25 with PTSD and unspecified Schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic  
 26 disorder. The patient is also prescribed high doses of a mood stabilizer and  
 27 an antipsychotic. The clinician only documented that the patient "denied  
 28 DTS/DTO/AVH;" was "not reacting to any internal stimuli;" and was  
 "eating ok." A computer-generated mental status exam was not completed  
 due to lack of time. No mention of the patient's medication was found in  
 this encounter. This is another example of a very inadequate clinical  
 encounter which places the patient at risk of harm.

Doc. 3704-2, at 5-8 (August 14, 2020). *See also* Doc. 3694-2 (identifying numerous  
 mental health encounters lasting five minutes or less); Doc. 3784-1 (same).

64. In addition, I concluded that brief and superficial mental health encounters  
 were a contributing factor in the suicides of at least five people in ADC custody. *See*  
 Exhibit 3's discussion of the suicides of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

1           65.     These extremely brief mental health encounters continue to the present time.  
2     Examples include [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 9/29/21 (2 minutes), 9/25/21 (2 minutes);  
3     [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 8/29/21 (2 minutes), 8/27/21 (2 minutes); [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
4     9/29/21 (3 minutes), 9/24/21 (3 minutes), 9/22/21 (3 minutes); 9/21/21 (3 minutes); and  
5     [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 9/17/21 (3 minutes).

6           66.     It is my understanding that some of these very short encounters with mental  
7     health staff are justified on the ground that the patient asked to terminate the encounter.  
8     However, such a request does not mean that the length of the encounter was appropriate.  
9     A patient may ask to terminate an encounter precisely because she is in distress. This does  
10    not mean that the patient does not need further attention from mental health staff; in many  
11    cases, it means exactly the opposite. In addition, in understaffed correctional mental  
12    health systems, mental health staff may communicate, either subtly or overtly, that they  
13    are in a hurry and need to move on to the next patient, which may lead the patient to agree  
14    to terminate the encounter.

15          67.     It is not acceptable for a mental health clinician to reflexively acquiesce in a  
16    patient's request to terminate the encounter. The clinician should make repeated efforts to  
17    engage with the patient and encourage him or her to talk. And even if the patient refuses  
18    to talk, the clinician is still required to assess and observe the patient, including evaluating  
19    his or her risk for self-harm or suicide. This can be accomplished in a variety of ways. The  
20    clinician should first observe the patient's hygiene. That is, is their personal appearance  
21    including clothing relatively neat or are they dirty, disheveled and malodorous? The  
22    cleanliness of the cell is also important to note. Again, is it relatively clean or are there  
23    food wrappers and other trash items strewn about the cell? Is the toilet flushed or is it  
24    backed up with feces, urine or trash? Next the clinician should carefully observe the  
25    patient to determine if they are displaying any overt signs of mental illness such as  
26    responding to internal stimuli. If after the clinician has performed this comprehensive  
27    observation and has repeatedly attempted to engage the patient in conversation and they  
28    still cannot determine the patient's degree of suicidality, then the patient should be



1 maintained on constant suicide watch status.

2 68. If the clinician spends less than 10 minutes (with a patient on suicide watch  
3 or in a post-watch follow-up encounter) or less than 30 minutes (with a patient receiving  
4 treatment), the clinician must still document the length of the encounter; the reasons why  
5 the session was shorter than required; and a detailed assessment of the patient, including  
6 risk of self-harm. A cursory note to the effect that “patient was agitated” or “patient  
7 waved me away” falls far below the standard of care and is unacceptable.

8 **d. Lack of Confidentiality/Cell-front Encounters**

9 69. There is a related issue that must be addressed: the very frequent use of cell-  
10 front encounters by mental health staff. Confidentiality of the interaction between patient  
11 and clinician is essential to the provision of effective mental health treatment and  
12 assessment of the patient’s risk. Even more than a clinician treating physical ailments, a  
13 mental health clinician must rely on full and frank disclosure by the patient of her  
14 symptoms, thoughts, and feelings. If the patient withholds information because of a fear  
15 that they will be overheard, the clinician may be unable to establish a therapeutic  
16 relationship, make an accurate diagnosis, or effectively plan treatment. In less serious  
17 cases this will lead to erroneous diagnosis and ineffective treatment; in more serious cases  
18 it may lead the clinician to miss critical warning signs of impending self-harm or suicide.

19 70. In his report, Dr. Stern concludes that “Cell-front visits during watch are,  
20 unfortunately, very common at ADC.” Doc. 3379 at 29 n. 20. He explains:

21 [C]onducting [mental health] encounters in a confidential space is of  
22 paramount importance for patients on watch because it helps ensure that the  
23 patients share complete and accurate information with the clinician,  
24 information which is key to assessing risk. Unfortunately, a very high  
percentage of the watch-related encounters I reviewed were conducted at the  
cell-front (i.e. non-confidentially).

25 \* \* \*

26 Inadequate assessments can result in one or more of the following errors: (1)  
27 inappropriate initial assignment to a particular level of watch (i.e., constant  
28 observation, 10-minute checks, 30-minute checks); (2) inappropriate  
promotion to a less intense level of watch; (3) failure to provide adequate  
treatment or resolution of factors which contributed to the need to be placed  
in watch.

1 Doc. 3379 at 121.

2 71. Dr. Stern then cites a case in which the repeated use of cell-front encounters  
3 with a patient on suicide watch contributed to the patient being placed “at a significant  
4 risk of serious harm.” Doc. 3379 at 121-22.

5 72. While it is my understanding that patients are required to be offered the  
6 opportunity to leave their cells to speak with mental health staff in a confidential setting,  
7 Dr. Stern explains that ADC policy may discourage patients from doing so:

8 [T]he policy of shackling patients when taking them from their cells to  
9 private rooms to meet with the mental health clinician merits scrutiny.  
10 Currently patients on watch are housed in living units designated as high  
11 level of custody. Many, if not most, of these patients do not meet the criteria  
12 of high custody. However, they are still subjected to the requirements of  
13 high custody (notably shackling before removal from the cell). It is likely  
14 that the prospect of having to be shackled serves as a deterrent to agreeing to  
be taken out of their cell. It is also possible that CO and mental health  
clinician staffing levels would need to be adjusted because transferring a  
patient from his or her watch cell to a confidential setting is more time-  
consuming than cell-front encounters, not only because the transfer takes  
time, but also because the encounters are likely to last longer.

15 Doc. 3379 at 123.

16 73. The people with mental illness who I spoke with at Eyman Browning and  
17 SMU-I overwhelmingly told me that due to the onerous security practices that were in  
18 effect every time they left their cells, including strip searches and in some cases body  
19 cavity inspections, and being uncomfortably chained at their hands and ankles, that to the  
20 extent they were even offered a confidential setting for a mental health encounter, they  
21 always refused and said that a cell-front was acceptable. That said, they also indicated that  
22 because they were speaking to mental health staff cell-front, normally within earshot of  
23 other incarcerated people and correctional officers, they normally self-censored and would  
24 not report problematic side effects or symptoms.

25 74. Many of the very short mental health encounters I came across in my record  
26 reviews – including all of those set forth in III.B.1.c above – occurred at cell-front. Many  
27 of these encounters involved desperately ill people – precisely those who are most in  
28

1 need of unimpeded, confidential communication with mental health professionals so that  
2 their illness can be diagnosed and treated.

3 75. I am also concerned about the inadequacy of the “health and welfare  
4 checks” that are conducted on people housed in isolation. The ADC Mental Health  
5 Technical Manual requires:

6 All patients (regardless of mental health score) housed in restrictive housing  
7 shall receive a health and welfare check at least weekly by mental health or  
8 medical staff (not to include LPNs).

9 Mental health staff or medical staff (not to included LPNs) shall perform a  
10 health and welfare check on all SMI patients in restrictive housing three (3)  
11 times a week.

12 Chapter 3, Section 8.0, “Mental Health Service Delivery In Restrictive Housing.”

13 76. These periodic clinical rounds function as a mentally ill prisoner’s lifeline  
14 when he or she is housed in isolation. These encounters are crucially important to ensure  
15 that if a prisoner is decompensating, the problems are identified and steps are taken to  
16 move him or her to a mental health crisis bed in a clinical setting, and increase monitoring  
17 to reduce the likelihood of self-harm or suicide. In order to determine if a prisoner is  
18 showing signs and symptoms of a serious mental disorder, there must be meaningful  
19 communication between the mental health staff and the patient, and the person performing  
20 the rounds must be competent to evaluate the patient for signs of decompensation.

21 77. The MHTM sets forth no guidance on how these rounds are to be  
22 performed, and no minimum qualifications for the persons performing them, except that  
23 they must be “mental health staff or medical staff (not to include LPNs).” It appears that  
24 in practice these checks are often performed by a “Behavioral Health Technician” or a  
25 “Mental Health Clerk.” It is not apparent to me that these persons are qualified, or receive  
26 any training, to conduct these critically important monitoring visits. Most of the notes  
27 from these encounters are extremely superficial – for example, indicating that the patient  
28 gave a “thumbs up” sign. In some cases, it is unclear whether the staff person even spoke  
to the patient. Such encounters are entirely inadequate to determine whether a patient is  
decompensating under the stresses of isolated confinement.

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## 2. **Opinion: Inadequate Treatment Plans and Failure To Coordinate Care Between Psychiatric and Mental Health Staff, or With Medical Providers, Puts People at Risk of Harm**

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78. An adequate treatment plan is the foundation of minimally effective mental health treatment. A treatment plan must be formulated by key members of the treatment team; it must be regularly updated to reflect changes in the patient's condition; and it must be readily accessible when treatment is rendered. The treatment team plans I reviewed do not meet minimum standards. In most cases it reflected no involvement by or input from the psychiatrist. If the patient's treatment includes psychotropic medication – which was the case in virtually every chart I reviewed – this is a serious omission. More generally, the treatment plans were often incomplete, with key information missing.

79. For example, at Tucson Rincon's suicide watch unit on September 9, 2021, I attempted to speak with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] who appeared severely depressed. He was sitting in his cell staring at the floor, had a very flat affect, and refused come out to speak to me. His medical record showed that the day before I saw him, there was an emergency ICS response where he was brought to the suicide watch unit on a restraint chair, and reported to staff that he was "not feeling me in my head, I can't sleep." Affect for this encounter was described as "flat". Individual counseling session on 9/17/2021 noted mental status exam with stable affect and mood despite in assessment sharing "he is diagnosed with Major Depression, congruent with his presentation." And this encounter note acknowledges the patient being on Lamictal and Risperdal which are "incongruent with his reported symptoms." The patient was described as having "anxiety and depressive symptoms." His varied diagnoses have included: Other specified schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorders, Unspecified Schizophrenia, Unspecified Adjustment Disorder, Unspecified Mood (Affective) Disorder, and Major Depressive Disorder, Recurrent, Moderate Severity. The last psychiatric prescriber mid-level assessment was on 8/10/2021. The diagnosis at this visit was "Unspecified Mood (Affective) Disorder), with a follow-up with the psychiatrist set for 90 days. This case

1 desperately calls out for a detailed team collaboration between psychiatry providers and  
2 psychology staff (and with the patient's input), because his diagnoses of underlying illness  
3 keeps changing, and there is disagreement between the treatment team as to the cause of  
4 the symptoms, which affects what treatment modalities are most appropriate or which  
5 medications can address his symptoms.

6 80. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] at ASPC-Eyman is another example of no apparent  
7 coordination between the psychologist and psychiatrist. I attempted to interview Mr.  
8 [REDACTED] at cell front on 9/8/21. Upon approaching his cell, I noted that he was pacing while  
9 shouting at non-existent individuals, displaying rambling and incoherent speech. After  
10 many attempts, I was unable to engage him in a proper interview. A review of his records  
11 revealed that his most current diagnosis is Schizoaffective Disorder, unspecified type,  
12 dated 6/11/18. His medication is a low dose of the antipsychotic Abilify, 5 mg twice a  
13 day. A psychiatric progress note from 8/19/21 noted that Mr. [REDACTED] has tangential  
14 thought processes, delusional thought content, paranoia and auditory/visual hallucinations.  
15 The note did not contain any discussion about augmenting the antipsychotic treatment.  
16 Finally, a treatment plan dated 9/1/21 noted Mr. [REDACTED]' psychosis but did not mention  
17 anything about referring him back to the psychiatrist for a medication adjustment. This  
18 represents poor care due to the patient being highly symptomatic and nothing being done  
19 to address these psychotic symptoms.

20 81. There also was a lack of coordination between psychiatry and psychology  
21 staff in the treatment of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] I spoke to Ms. [REDACTED] at a mental  
22 health step-down unit at ASPC-Perryville on September 10, 2021. She had recently come  
23 off of mental health watch after experiencing suicidal ideation and cutting herself. She  
24 reported that she had engaged in acts of self-harm and hurting others in response to  
25 auditory hallucinations since she was 14 years old and living in probation and foster care  
26 group homes. Her arms were covered with fresh and healed cut marks. Her medical record  
27 showed numerous differing diagnoses, including Unspecified Adjustment Disorder,  
28 Unspecified Mood (Affective) Disorder, Chronic PTSD, and Borderline Personality

1 Disorder. She had a midlevel psychiatric provider evaluation on 8/2/21 the day after one  
2 act of self-harm. The patient was noted to be receiving “treatment adequate in managing  
3 mood and psychiatric symptoms”. Furthermore, on the 8/2/21 and all future mid-level  
4 psychiatric prescriber documentation, there is no mention of any other diagnosis other  
5 than Unspecified Mood Disorder. In the assessment sections of these notes, there was no  
6 effort to explain how diagnosis relates to self-harm behavior. On the contrary, the  
7 psychology team’s concurrent notes share different diagnoses which include PTSD and  
8 Borderline Personality Disorder. Ms. [REDACTED] has multiple diagnoses and different  
9 providers on the same team have different diagnoses for her. There appears to be no  
10 multidisciplinary team discussion or collaborative treatment of her care. Furthermore, the  
11 psychiatric prescriber does not provide adequate documentation explaining how self-harm  
12 behavior relates to the listed diagnoses for that encounter. Medications are tailored to  
13 diagnosis, and if the diagnoses are not accurate and/or do not reflect the opinions of the  
14 whole treatment team, care can remain deficient.

15 82. Other examples include:

- 16 • [REDACTED]
- 17 [REDACTED]
- 18 [REDACTED]
- 19 [REDACTED]
- 20 [REDACTED]

21 *See Exhibit 2.*

22 83. A related problem is the need for coordination between medical and mental  
23 health staff in patient care. For example, I interviewed [REDACTED] at ASPC-  
24 Phoenix Flamenco Unit on September 23, 2021. He presented as responding to internal  
25 stimuli. When I asked if he were hearing voices, he stated that he still hears voices and  
26 that they still tell him to hurt himself. He stated that he suffers from Schizophrenia and  
27 diabetes. He went on to say that he isn’t taking any antipsychotic medication due to the  
28 complications with his diabetes. A review of his record revealed that his current diagnosis

1 is “Schizophrenia, unspecified.” He also suffers from Type 2 diabetes for which he  
2 receives the oral hypoglycemic agent, Metformin, 1000 mg twice a day. At the time of my  
3 interview, he had not taken any antipsychotic medication for over six weeks. The most  
4 recent blood test for his diabetes was obtained on 8/18/21. His HbA1c which reflects his  
5 blood sugar levels was 7.7 (4.1-6.5 is normal). Given his active psychosis and his issue  
6 with elevated blood sugar, his care should necessarily include close coordination between  
7 his medical and psychiatric care. I found no evidence of that type of coordination in his  
8 records. The patient was scheduled for a 30-day follow up. This really is not a  
9 complicated case. It does require a more aggressive treatment for his diabetes and the  
10 judicious use of antipsychotic medication. Also, a 30-day follow up is very inappropriate  
11 for such a clinically complicated patient.

12 84. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was housed at a step-down inpatient mental health  
13 setting at Perryville when I spoke with her on September 10, 2021. She described herself  
14 as “schizophrenic” and reported to me that her antidepressant duloxetine (Cymbalta) had  
15 been abruptly discontinued and caused multiple withdrawal symptoms, including back  
16 pain. Her medical record confirmed that her Duloxetine 60 mg. was discontinued on  
17 8/16/2021 due to concerns regarding mania. There was no titration planned of gradually  
18 reducing the dosage. The Medication Administration Record showed a sudden stop on  
19 8/19/2021. Nurses documented in assessment an endorsement of fears regarding pain  
20 control without her duloxetine. On 8/22 and 8/23 she activated sick call due to “body  
21 pain” and worsening mood symptoms requesting medication for symptoms. It appears Ms.  
22 [REDACTED] was suddenly discontinued off Cymbalta (Duloxetine) without collaborative  
23 discussion respecting her autonomy for her mental health and medical care. Symptoms of  
24 pain and the worsening mood were reported shortly after discontinuation of Cymbalta.  
25 Furthermore, Cymbalta was not titrated which can lead to withdrawal symptoms  
26 consistent with body aches. Given duloxetine was prescribed not only for mood but also  
27 pain management, an integrated care approach should have been considered to prevent  
28 decompensation.

1           85. At Perryville on September 10, 2021, I was at the mental health watch unit  
2 and observed ██████████ ██████████ ██████████ facedown on a mat on the floor with apparent  
3 involuntary movement and spasms, which resulted in an emergency ICS response by  
4 nursing staff. A review of her medical record shows that a medical provider intake note on  
5 8/17/2021 documented “involuntary movements of limbs,” but the assessment and plan  
6 sections of the note did not explain the involuntary movements. Her intake laboratory  
7 findings were significant for elevated ammonia, Hepatitis C RNA levels, and elevated  
8 liver function enzymes. An 8/25/2021 medical provider evaluation explored the further  
9 history of Ms. ██████████ and noted that when she was at the jail, she was supposed to have  
10 had a brain MRI per Neurology. At this encounter, a MRI of the brain with contrast was  
11 requested in the plan, along with starting amantadine and requesting medical records from  
12 outside specialists. A follow up medical provider note on 8/27/2021 stated that her  
13 movements were possibly exaggerated and possible “psychosomatic” etiology. Records  
14 from neurology were not obtained yet. The medical provider’s note on 9/10/2021  
15 documented that Ms. ██████████ was on watch and it revealed neurology workup at the county  
16 jail included exploration for multiple etiology. This included Huntington’s disease, tardive  
17 dyskinesia, and the possibility of a volitional component to the movement. Workup was  
18 not completed at that time. A 9/14/2021 assessment by a medical provider led to greater  
19 suspicion of volitional component, but it was the first time a neurology consult was  
20 requested by the provider. A 9/16/2021 medical provider note described the assessment as  
21 psychosomatic versus malingering but she was started and continued on Tetrabenazine for  
22 suspected movement disorder. Ms. ██████████ reported to the team that after receiving  
23 Cogentin injections her movements improved for three days before returning. The  
24 etiology of Ms. ██████████’s movements is unclear at best given the lack of thorough  
25 neurology workup. The medical team suspects symptoms are due to a psychosomatic  
26 etiology or malingering, but medication management with Cogentin and Tetrabenazine  
27 does not reflect this mindset. Furthermore, previous neurology work up was not  
28 completed and on admission, her liver function enzymes, ammonia level, and hepatitis C



1 viral RNA count were all elevated. It could be likely there is a psychosomatic component  
2 or even volitional component to her symptoms, but you cannot determine these diagnoses  
3 without appropriate neurologic workup especially in the presence of abnormal medical lab  
4 findings. Such assessments for psychosomatic causes and malingering are made after  
5 excluding possible medical and neurologic causes. The possibility of there being a  
6 medical etiology which is not worked up in a timely fashion is a burden to the patient as  
7 seen by repeated ICS and watch events. Closer collaboration is needed between the  
8 medical and mental health providers.

9 86. There were at least five recent deaths by suicide where a contributing factor  
10 appears to be a breakdown in communication between mental health and medical staff.  
11 See Exhibit 3 ( [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
12 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Of note, several of the deaths  
13 occurred after patients with serious medical conditions – including end stage cancer,  
14 disabilities from physical injuries, or fibromyalgia – were told that their pain was not real,  
15 or patients were judged as “drug-seeking,” and medical providers repeatedly failed to  
16 engage with them in a discussion about appropriate and adequate pain management.  
17 Patients had their pain medications abruptly discontinued without explanation, in a very  
18 callous and hostile attitude by medical providers. Dr. Todd Wilcox has, in past reports,  
19 described ADCRR’s profound failure to treat serious pain, (*see, e.g.*, Doc. 2496 ¶¶ 6, 17,  
20 18, 27), and has described it as “therapeutic nihilism... that seems to be the norm in the  
21 Arizona prison health care system.” *Id.* at ¶ 18.

22 87. The death by suicide of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] 2019 at Tucson-  
23 [REDACTED] is emblematic of how the failures of mental health and medical care can  
24 collide and result in an untimely death. ADC’s vendor’s Utilization Management  
25 department denied a provider’s request for a referral to a specialist for a possible  
26 recurrence of cancer. The mental health team did not appropriately evaluate and treat the  
27 patient for mood disorders. There was a lack of multidisciplinary team discussion in  
28 treatment planning. The psychological autopsy conducted after his death by suicide

1 concluded that he would have benefited from interdisciplinary team collaboration, and  
2 that there had been no follow up with him to tell him that Utilization Management had  
3 cancelled the provider's request for a CT scan to analyze a mass in his throat. The  
4 mortality review acknowledged that he had submitted multiple HNRs regarding his cancer  
5 pain symptoms, but staff screening the HNRs did not appreciate the level and severity of  
6 his pain symptoms, and did not make referrals to practitioners. His medications were  
7 discontinued due to apparent non-compliance due to side effects, without counseling by a  
8 prescriber. The medical provider prescribed Elavil for treatment of pain, but the  
9 psychiatry team switched him to Venlafaxine without consultation with the medical staff.  
10 Both the psychological autopsy and mortality review shared significant concerns for the  
11 lack of coordination in medical and psychiatric care provided to the patient. There was  
12 also an acknowledgment of inadequate pain management. If he had received timely and  
13 appropriate medical and psychiatric follow up, better rapport could have been formed with  
14 him, which would allow the treatment team to better appreciate the underlying  
15 psychological distress from the recurrence of cancer and untreated pain.

16 88. While physical pain can be a subjective and difficult symptom to treat and  
17 manage, the objective and difficult truth is that there are multiple people who -- in the past  
18 three years -- were so desperate that they completed an act of suicide after medical  
19 providers failed to acknowledge or address their physical pain. If these medical providers  
20 thought that the pain these patients described was not real, psychosomatic, related to a  
21 substance abuse disorder, or rooted in a need to self-medicate a poorly-treated or managed  
22 mental disorder, then the appropriate response would have been for the medical provider  
23 to engage and confer with psychology clinicians and psychiatry providers to develop an  
24 interdisciplinary treatment plan. That did not happen.

### 25 **3. Opinion: The Failure to Provide Interpretation in Mental Health** 26 **Treatment Places Class Members Not Fluent in English at Risk of Harm**

27 89. One of the first things mental health staff should do before commencing any  
28 encounter with a patient, is to ensure that they are able to effectively communicate with

1 the patient. If they cannot do so, then the encounter is largely meaningless and superficial.  
2 Effective communication is a fundamental component of providing therapeutic care,  
3 especially in the context of mental health treatment, and the burden should be on the staff  
4 to ensure that they are communicating fully and effectively with the patient. In my  
5 November 2013 expert report, I described the importance of having interpretation as part  
6 of medical encounters and being able to communicate with patients in the language for  
7 which they are most fluent, to ensure effective communication, that there is a full and  
8 complete exchange of information, and so patients can convey information to clinicians  
9 and providers. I noted that,

10 Accurate mental health diagnosis and effective mental health treatment  
11 require accurate communication between the patient and the provider. The  
12 patient must be able to describe his or her emotional or cognitive state, and  
13 the provider must be able to observe often subtle cues in the patient's  
14 speech. It goes without saying that such communication requires a common  
15 language.

16 [. . .] I am concerned that ADC has no system for providing effective,  
17 qualified, confidential interpretation for mental health diagnosis and  
18 treatment.

19 [. . .] [A] mental health provider must make very subtle assessments, such as  
20 whether a patient is paranoid or attending to internal stimuli, and whether  
21 his or her thoughts are tangential. This requires an interpreter who not only  
22 is fluent in both languages, but is also specifically trained in interpretation,  
23 including specialized psychiatric vocabulary.

24 See Doc. 1104-2, 11/8/13 Report, at 49-51.

25 90. I detailed my interviews in 2013 with Spanish-speaking patients who  
26 described their frustration with being unable to share vital and nuanced information in a  
27 therapeutic relationship with mental health providers and clinicians. *Id.* As a result of the  
28 shortcomings that I and others identified, the Stipulation included a provision regarding  
language interpretation in health care encounters: "For prisoners who are not fluent in  
English, language interpretation for healthcare encounters shall be provided by a qualified  
health care practitioner who is proficient in the prisoner's language, or by a language line  
interpretation service." Doc. 1185 ¶ 14.

1           91. Paragraph 14 by its plain language limits interpreting to be done by health  
2 care staff or an independent interpretation service, and therefore excludes the use of  
3 custody staff or other incarcerated people from interpreting in health care encounters. This  
4 limitation was on purpose, as the use of corrections officers as interpreters in health care  
5 encounters in prison and jail settings is highly inappropriate for a number of reasons. As a  
6 threshold matter, using custody staff necessarily results in inappropriate disclosure of  
7 confidential patient health information. The presence of custody staff may cause patients  
8 to self-censor or alter communications with the provider, depriving the provider of  
9 critically important information. For example, if a patient is bothered by intrusive  
10 flashbacks to past trauma or the facts of their commitment offense, they may be unlikely  
11 to disclose that to the mental health staff in the presence of a corrections officer for fear  
12 that the information could get out or be used against them. Similarly, using other  
13 incarcerated people as interpreters introduces these same concerns regarding patient  
14 confidentiality and safety.

15           92. Despite this requirement, over the course of the monitoring of this case, it  
16 became clear that ADCRR and their health care vendors did not abide by Paragraph 14.  
17 During my visits to prisons in 2018 and 2019, and again in September 2021, I met with  
18 Spanish-speaking patients with mental health needs, who reported that they were unable  
19 to have meaningful mental health encounters with staff due to language barriers. I am  
20 fluent in Spanish; I have spoken it from childhood. When I visit prisons' mental health  
21 units, I seek out monolingual Spanish speakers. They often report suicidal thoughts or  
22 auditory or visual hallucinations, but when I review their medical charts, there is nothing  
23 recorded that reflects that. That is of significant concern.

24           93. My 2020 expert declaration in support of Plaintiffs' Paragraph 14  
25 enforcement motion noted that,

26           It is important not only for the patient to provide information, but for the  
27 patient to receive information, and the parties can't do this in a superficial  
28 manner. When a provider (whether it be a medical or mental health  
provider) is trying to provide patient education, or the diagnoses and  
treatment modalities and options to the patient, the provider cannot engage

1 the patient in the treatment process if the parties cannot fully and effectively  
2 communicate in a common language.

3 With regard to mental health care in particular, a recent study published in  
4 *Clinical Psychological Science* found clear and consistent differences in the  
5 use of language by those with depression, anxiety, and suicidal ideation. See  
6 Al-Mosaiwi and Johnstone, *In an Absolute State: Elevated Use of Absolutist  
7 Words Is a Marker Specific to Anxiety, Depression, and Suicidal Ideation*,  
8 *Clinical Psychological Science*, 2018, 6(4), 529–542, at  
9 <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2167702617747074> [...]

10 Scientists, psychologists, and psychiatrists have long observed that major  
11 depression changes the way people speak and write (sometimes referred to  
12 as “the language of depression”), most past studies of this relied upon  
13 mental health encounter notes, while this study used computerized textual  
14 analysis of thousands of posts on 64 different online mental health  
15 fora/support groups. The computerized analysis was able to spot linguistic  
16 features including classes of words, lexical diversity, lengths of sentences,  
17 and grammatical patterns. The study confirmed what those of us who  
18 regularly see people with these conditions recognize: that there are  
19 differences in the use of language, both in terms of content and style. With  
20 regard to content, people with depression, anxiety, and suicidal thoughts are  
21 much more likely to use negative adjectives and adverbs, and first-person  
22 pronouns (e.g., “I,” “me,” “myself”) instead of third-person or collective  
23 pronouns (e.g., “we,” “us,” “they”). In terms of style (how people express  
24 themselves), the use of absolutist words (conveying absolute magnitudes,  
25 e.g., “always,” “nothing,” or “completely”) was found to occur quite  
26 frequently in people with depression, given their tendency to have a more  
27 rigid, black and white view of the world. The study found that the  
28 prevalence of absolutist words (compared to control fora) was 50% greater  
for people with anxiety or depression, and 80% higher for people  
experiencing suicidal ideation.

The practical implication of this is clear when the primary language of the  
health care provider and the patient are different. A mental health provider  
needs to evaluate the severity of the symptoms, especially for those patients  
with suicidal or homicidal thoughts, or people experiencing auditory or  
visual hallucinations. Using as an example a patient whose primary  
language is Spanish and a provider whose primary language is English, even  
patients with some ability to converse in English will not be able to  
articulate and express the nuances of their current mental state the way they  
could if they were speaking in their native tongue of Spanish. Similarly, a  
provider who may speak some Spanish is not going to understand or know  
the nuances and phrasing by Spanish-speaking patients that may signal the  
degree of mental health distress, or be able to pick up on the subtleties of the  
Spanish language’s adjectives and verb tenses.

Doc. 3626, ¶¶ 11-13.

94. My 2020 declaration referred to specific problematic mental health  
encounters between clinicians and class members who did not speak English fluently –

1 either monolingual Spanish speakers, or Deaf people who communicate using American  
2 Sign Language or other systems of sign language. *Id.*, ¶¶ 14-16, 18, 24-28.

3 95. I have reviewed the Court's February 24, 2021 order, which said "If a  
4 prisoner is not fluent in English, the fact that the medical encounter continued without  
5 interpretive services is definitive proof of Defendants' noncompliance with Paragraph 14"  
6 and ordered Defendants to develop a plan to ensure compliance with Paragraph 14. Doc.  
7 3861 at 12. I have reviewed the Defendants' Revised Compliance Plan (Doc. 3920) dated  
8 July 13, 2021, and am concerned that almost eight years after my report detailed why not  
9 providing interpretation for mental health services was deeply problematic, the  
10 Department continues to not have a system in place to identify and track class members  
11 who require an interpreter in health care encounters, nor does it track which staff are  
12 bilingual. That is simply unacceptable. As I noted in June 2020,

13 ADC and its contractor must develop a process to promptly identify all  
14 people for whom English is not their first language, and identify their  
15 primary language. This should include people who are deaf and who  
16 communicate through sign language. Such identification should occur at  
17 intake to ADC custody. This is a standard practice in functional correctional  
18 health care systems. ADC and its contractor also must create a system by  
19 which patients can later report to health care staff that they need interpreters,  
20 so that this information is available when scheduling appointments. This is  
21 relevant for when patients who may speak and understand some English, but  
22 when confronted with a complicated health care encounter where they are  
23 trying to understand complex medical language, or who are attempting to  
24 articulate their emotional state, they realize that they need an interpreter to  
25 fully communicate with the health care providers so that they can express  
26 themselves in their primary language

27 Doc. 3626 at ¶ 20.

28 96. Defendants' failure to adhere to standard health care practice to ensure  
effective communication in health care encounters does not meet the community standard  
of care and places non-English speaking class members and class members with  
disabilities at a significantly higher risk of serious and permanent injury than class  
members who can communicate freely with mental health staff.

97. I also previously brought to the Court's attention the failure to provide any  
sort of group mental health programming or therapy with translation services, or in special

1 groups for people who do not speak English. Doc. 3626 at ¶¶ 29-34. Defendants’ Revised  
2 Compliance Plan asserts their position that they “maintain that the intent of Paragraph 14  
3 applies to healthcare encounters involving the individual inmate and health care staff and  
4 thus undefined ‘group therapy’ sessions do not require translation services – nor could  
5 translation services be reasonably provided in that type of group setting.” Doc. 3920 at 13-  
6 14. This is disingenuous at best; first, there is no such limitation in Paragraph 14 to  
7 individual encounters; and second, my declaration clearly described how effective  
8 communication could be achieved in group mental health therapy sessions. If Defendants  
9 and their attorneys truly don’t understand what “group therapy” means, then that is a  
10 damning admission of willful ignorance about what is a crucial component of the  
11 rehabilitative and therapeutic milieu. Doc. 3626 at ¶¶ 33-34.

12 98. Defendants’ revised compliance plan for interpretation services also asserts  
13 that “Plaintiffs’ challenge that Defendants do not provide translation services for inmates  
14 on suicide watch is in error where, but for emergency circumstances, inmates are taken  
15 out of cell for healthcare encounters and conducted in locations with access to  
16 LanguageLine services where an inmate requires the same. Thus, inmates are not denied  
17 translation services in this setting.” Doc. 3920 at 13. This is contradicted by the fact that  
18 the majority of people on mental health watch are normally seen cell front, and there is no  
19 indication that people who are Deaf or do not speak English fluently somehow are seen  
20 cell-front on watch with sign language interpreters or with LanguageLine services.

21 99. With regard to Deaf incarcerated people and the need for effective  
22 communication in mental health care, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of  
23 California held that I am “an expert on mental health treatment and suicide prevention in  
24 prisons, including in segregated housing units,” and “qualified to testify on the standards  
25 of mental health practices in such settings,” when it relied upon my opinion regarding  
26 effective communication to order the California prison system to ensure that sign  
27 language interpretation was provided to people who are Deaf, including “suicidal  
28 prisoners” who were “systematically denied sign language interpreters” while in

1 segregated housing or suicide watch. *See Armstrong v. Brown*, 939 F.Supp.2d 1012, 1022,  
 2 and n.6 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (finding that the California prison systems’ failure to provide  
 3 sign language interpreters “created a substantial and unnecessary risk to class members.”).  
 4 A head-shake, “thumbs up,” “thumbs down,” or finger-spelling simply is inadequate to  
 5 assess if a person is suicidal. With regard to written notes, given that English is not the  
 6 first language of most Deaf people, and many if not most have limited reading / writing  
 7 skills in English, this is patently inadequate for mental health staff to determine if patients  
 8 exhibit possible signs and symptoms of a serious mental or medical condition and to  
 9 provide patient education to a patient.

10 100. Deaf people are a particularly vulnerable population in a prison, given their  
 11 almost complete social isolation from others. Even when housed in non-isolation units,  
 12 their existence, without an ability to communicate with others around them or their loved  
 13 ones, is a de facto solitary confinement. My 2020 analysis of medical records of Deaf or  
 14 hearing-impaired class members showed they had gone months – if not years – unable to  
 15 communicate meaningfully with health care staff without an interpreter. One Deaf class  
 16 member reported when he met with mental health staff, and had to use notes, “[w]ithout  
 17 an ASL interpreter, I could not really explain my feelings of loneliness and isolation and  
 18 what it is like to be deprived constantly of language.” Doc. 3627-6; Ex. 83 ¶ 40.

19 101. I was appalled to see the written exchange between a psych associate and a  
 20 Deaf patient when he was put on suicide watch after learning his brother died by suicide:

21 Homocidal? kill others? NO  
 22 Hallucinations NO  
 23 eating ok OK  
 24 sleeping ok OK  
 25 feeling Anxious. NO  
 26 Depressed NO  
 27 How are you feeling w/ your loss  
 28 grief is like a fart if you force it, it just might be shit. ~~mean~~ meaning dont rush through the grieving process ok. I get it I really want to come back CATALINA



1 Doc. 3627-7, Ex. 99 at 10.

2 102. Holding aside the substance of the psych associate's written "counseling"  
3 notes ("greif [sic] is like a fart"), this illustrates that health care staff write terser versions  
4 of what they would normally verbalize to a hearing patient. It is an awkward, stilted, and  
5 slow way to communicate, and does not provide an appropriate or adequate medium to  
6 engage the patient in discussion of sensitive and important mental health matters.

7 103. Another Deaf class member reported that without an SLI in a mental health  
8 encounter, "I wanted to discuss my anxiety but I had a hard time discussing it with just  
9 pen and paper." Doc. 3627-5, Ex. 62 ¶ 16. These patients are trying to report significant  
10 mental health issues, that if unaddressed can lead to an increased risk of self-harm or  
11 suicide. Asking a Deaf person experiencing mental health issues to write in a language  
12 they are not fluent in is unreliable and totally puts the burden of achieving effective  
13 communication on the patient. These people are already burdened enough by being  
14 incarcerated, and by being in a setting where they are completely isolated from  
15 meaningful human interaction due to their disability, and it is absurd to expect that they  
16 will be able to meaningfully engage with treatment staff without interpretation.

17 104. During the September 2021 visits in anticipation for this report, I again  
18 spoke with Spanish-speaking patients regarding their experiences with receiving health  
19 care. At ASPC-Tucson on September 9, 2021, Plaintiffs' counsel who separately  
20 accompanied medical expert Dr. Todd Wilcox asked me to speak with [REDACTED]  
21 [REDACTED] a monolingual Spanish speaker who had just been discharged from the  
22 infirmary. Mr. [REDACTED] said that during his hospitalization in the IPC, there were a couple  
23 of health care staff who spoke decent Spanish, but the majority of his encounters with  
24 nursing and provider staff in the infirmary were not done with interpretation. He indicated  
25 that the IPC staff had never used the telephonic Language Line to interpret interactions,  
26 and if staff did not speak Spanish, they would either speak to him in English, or use other  
27 patients or custody staff who spoke some Spanish to interpret.

28

1           105. On September 9, 2021, I met with several monolingual Spanish speakers  
2 designated as SMI, housed in specialized mental health units at Tucson, Rincon Unit.

3           106. I spoke with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] at Tucson-Rincon Unit, who told  
4 me that he is classified as SMI. He said he cannot speak or write English very well, but  
5 can understand enough English “to nod my head.” He stated that due to a language barrier  
6 with his treatment mental health staff, he does not know his actual mental health  
7 diagnosis, nor does he know the names of his medications. He reported that he has not  
8 received any patient education about his medications or their potential side effects. He  
9 cannot describe the nuances of his emotions and feelings in English. He stated that “at  
10 times” the mental health staff speak enough Spanish to communicate with him but  
11 otherwise, he relies upon very simple English words to try to convey complex emotions.  
12 He reported that most, if not all, group mental health programs have been canceled since  
13 March 2020 due to COVID and that the group therapy is never provided in Spanish.

14           107. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] is a Spanish-speaking trans woman  
15 incarcerated at Tucson-Rincon Unit, who is classified as SMI, and has diagnoses of  
16 gender dysphoria, schizophrenia, depression, paranoia, and anxiety. In addition, Ms.  
17 [REDACTED] reported that she experiences command auditory hallucinations that instruct her to  
18 kill herself, and she has engaged in multiple acts of self-harm including a self-castration in  
19 2017 because she thought her estrogen hormone therapy was not working quickly enough  
20 to change her gender. She described multiple suicide attempts, including while on mental  
21 health watch and in specialized mental health units. She reported that she has not been  
22 able to tell her prescribing psychiatric nurse practitioner that her current medications of  
23 Risperdal and Paxil do not mediate the voices, and that she has breakthrough experiences  
24 of profound paranoia several times a week. Until a few weeks prior to our interview, she  
25 had been incarcerated at the now-closed Florence-Kasson Unit, which she described as a  
26 “lonely” location filled with needlessly cruel and abusive custody staff who would  
27 physically and verbally abuse and torment her and other seriously mentally ill patients.  
28

1           108. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] is another trans woman at Tucson-Rincon Unit who  
2 only speaks Spanish. She reports that she is not classified as SMI, but that she suffers  
3 from depression, auditory hallucinations, and insomnia. She reported that none of the  
4 mental health programs, including group therapy, are available in Spanish. She said that  
5 she cannot connect one-on-one with her mental health clinicians because they are  
6 constantly changing. She reported that she was able to build a good rapport and trust with  
7 a Spanish-speaking therapist, but that therapist quit, and Ms. [REDACTED] was unable to  
8 continue that relationship. She stated that to the extent any mental health programming or  
9 group therapy is provided to the people in her special mental health unit (and it is little), it  
10 has never been provided in Spanish. I found Ms. [REDACTED] to be a thoughtful, vivacious  
11 person who provided much nuance and insight when I spoke to her in Spanish, but she  
12 flatly told me that “I cannot speak English to be myself” to mental health staff.

13           109. During my September 23, 2021 visit to ASPC-Phoenix’s Flamenco Unit, I  
14 was alerted by multiple incarcerated people in that inpatient mental health unit to find and  
15 speak with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] because the others patients were very concerned  
16 about him. The other patients told me that “he isn’t doing well” and that he was often seen  
17 walking around his cell naked and smearing feces on himself and his cell walls. I went to  
18 his cell-front and asked the custody staff to open his door so that I could engage in  
19 conversation with him. After failing to get the patient’s attention in English, I began  
20 addressing him in Spanish. He responded by lifting his head off his bunk and looking at  
21 me. In spite of my efforts, he remained mute and unresponsive. Based on my observation,  
22 he appeared to be very psychotic, responding to internal stimuli as well as presenting as  
23 almost catatonic. A record review showed that he is not prescribed *any* psychotropic  
24 medications. This is an absolutely astounding fact given his degree of psychosis.

25           110. In fact, Mr. [REDACTED]’s medical record shows that he has spent extensive  
26 periods of time on suicide watch at the Phoenix, Florence, and Lewis prisons since he  
27 came into custody in August 2020. His record documents that he was on suicide watch at  
28 ASPC-Phoenix for *six months without interruption* (from January 19 to July 18, 2021),

1 and again from September 8-15, 2021; on watch at Florence September 1-7, 2021; and on  
2 watch at Lewis-Rast from September 6, 2020 to November 12, 2020 and December 28,  
3 2020 to January 19, 2021. Many of these entries show that he was mute or provided one-  
4 word responses in English. I found no indication that mental health staff attempted to  
5 speak to him in Spanish or use a qualified interpreter for their encounters.

- 6 • Intake – August 12, 2020 at Tucson Rincon
- 7 • Moved to Lewis Rast and put on **suicide watch**: Sept. 6– Nov. 12, 2020
- 8 • Lewis Rast max **suicide watch**: Dec. 28, 2020-Jan. 19, 2021
- 9 • Phoenix **suicide watch**: Jan. 19-July 18, 2021
- 10 • Phoenix Flamenco Ida Unit: July 20-Sept. 1, 2021
- 11 • Florence **suicide watch**: Sept. 1-7, 2021
- 12 • Phoenix **suicide watch**: Sept. 8-15, 2021
- 13 • Phoenix Flamenco Ida Unit: Sept. 15-present (I saw him on Sept. 23, his  
14 record was last checked on 9/30/2021).

15 111. A psychiatric progress note written three days before my evaluation of the  
16 patient stated that interpreter services were NOT needed for him. The provider then noted  
17 the patient's "underwear had feces on the posterior aspect. It took some time with redirect  
18 to get him to change his underwear. He was nonverbal. pt seemed perplexed and had  
19 difficult [sic] in responding to directions of CO in changing his underwear." The provider  
20 inexplicably went on to state "no evidence of psychosis." This psychiatric visit which  
21 occurred on 9/20/21 fails to even approach the standard of care for psychiatric visits. It is  
22 also appalling to me that this patient is not receiving any psychotropic medication. Also,  
23 the psychiatrist has no idea if the patient is suicidal. The patient is assigned to the  
24 inpatient psychiatric care facility at ASPC-Phoenix in name only. He needs a competent  
25 psychiatric evaluation from a Spanish-speaking psychiatrist. Based upon the results of that  
26 evaluation, a treatment plan must be designed to fit his unique clinical requirements.

27 //

28 //

1           **C. Opinion: Clinicians Practicing Below the Standard of Care Put Patients at**  
2           **Risk of Harm**

3           112. During my September 2021 review, I saw many examples of diagnosis and  
4 treatment decisions that fell below the standard of care. I emphasize that these are not  
5 matters of clinical judgment on which reasonable professionals can disagree. Instead, they  
6 are examples of clinical decisions that simply don't make any sense – that cannot be  
7 explained or justified based on the patient's clinical presentation. These errors put patients  
8 at a risk of harm, and in many cases result in needless suffering and deterioration.

9           **1. Opinion: Patients Remain Profoundly Symptomatic for Long Periods of**  
10           **Time**

11           113. As I spoke with seriously mentally ill people and individuals experiencing  
12 severe mental health distress at the four prisons, I was struck by how many of these  
13 people reported being highly symptomatic for very long periods of time. My past visits  
14 and medical file reviews showed the same. Not only does this mean that the patient is  
15 suffering, and in the worst cases may harm or kill herself, but many mental illnesses  
16 become more intractable and difficult to treat the longer the patient is symptomatic. This  
17 is known as the “kindling effect” in brain science, whereby the more a group of neurons  
18 are able to fire and misfire, they affect the other neurons around them. This is why you  
19 don't just allow somebody to be psychotic or seriously depressed and ignore or refuse to  
20 treat it, the same way that we don't allow people with seizures to continue to have  
21 seizures over and over because they worsen in time. These conditions must be addressed  
22 because each time there is a cycle of depression or psychosis that is not properly  
23 addressed, based on the circuitry of the brain, it gets worse the next time.

24           114. For example, I interviewed [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] at Eyman in a  
25 confidential setting on 9/8/21. I found him to be overtly psychotic with very loose  
26 associations, disorganized and rambling speech, responding to internal stimuli and thought  
27 blocking. He was able to tell me that he is not taking any medications currently but has  
28 taken the antipsychotic Risperdal in the past. A review of his records reveals that in fact  
he is not prescribed any psychotropic medications. He was determined to be SMI on

1 5/20/21 and was diagnosed as suffering from Schizophrenia. Of note he is yet to be seen  
2 by a psychiatrist since he was determined to be SMI. A treatment plan dated 9/1/21 had  
3 the “psychotic symptoms” box checked but had no mention of antipsychotic medications  
4 or a referral to a psychiatric practitioner. This case is the ultimate example of deliberate  
5 indifference. That is, the staff acknowledge that Mr. [REDACTED] is psychotic but are not doing  
6 anything to address it. He is a very ill young man who requires immediate treatment and  
7 close management by a psychiatric provider with an antipsychotic medication.

8 115. At ASPC-Phoenix’s Baker Unit I spoke with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] at  
9 cell front while he was on watch status. He presented as extremely manic and agitated. He  
10 was yelling at the custody staff and running around his cell naked. He had very pressured  
11 speech and an aggressive and expansive affect. He showed me the bruises on the left side  
12 of his abdomen and his torso where he said that the custody staff fired a paint ball gun at  
13 him when he was having a psychotic episode. I requested that staff take a photo of his  
14 injuries.



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25 Source: ADCR000158717

26 116. A review of his records revealed that Mr. [REDACTED] is only prescribed  
27 Risperdal Consta, 37.5 mg every two weeks. Of note, it takes up to ten weeks for this  
28

1 long-acting antipsychotic medication to reach therapeutic levels. Also, the patient was  
2 seen by a rec therapist and a psych associate on the same day of my evaluation. The rec  
3 therapist reported that Mr. [REDACTED] was “calm and friendly” and the psych associate used  
4 the phrase “due to increase stability.” I am at a loss to understand how these people came  
5 up with their assessments. Of note, the custody staff made me sit behind a special  
6 plexiglass barrier when I was conducting my interview due to the aggressiveness and  
7 instability of the patient. Finally, he was seen by a psychiatrist the day after my exam. The  
8 psychiatrist documented that “his mood was good.” He went on to say that the patient’s  
9 mood “may be somewhat elevated, but he is cheerful.” This is a completely incorrect  
10 description of a highly manic and psychotic patient; “cheerful” is the last word I would  
11 use to describe the patient’s demeanor.

12 117. The medication management of this patient is extremely poor. One does not  
13 attempt to stabilize a highly agitated and psychotic patient using long-acting injectable  
14 antipsychotic medication such as Risperdal Consta. As I mentioned above, it takes up to  
15 10 weeks to achieve therapeutic blood levels using this medication. Due to the abysmal  
16 medication management, Mr. [REDACTED] remains out of control psychiatrically which has  
17 resulted in his being paintballed by the custody staff. The patient is not receiving anything  
18 close to inpatient level of care.

19 118. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] I interviewed Mr. [REDACTED] at cell front on 9/8/21 at  
20 Eyman. He told me his was prescribed the antipsychotic Abilify. He also reported  
21 experiencing persistent auditory hallucinations of a command type. His voices command  
22 him to hurt himself and others. He stated the Abilify “helps a little.” A review of his  
23 records reveals that he has been prescribed the same dose of Abilify, 15 mg in the  
24 evening, since May 14, 2020. This is in spite of a psychologist noting on 9/16/21 the  
25 patient’s problem with auditory hallucinations. In this note, despite these ongoing  
26 symptoms of command hallucinations to hurt himself and others -- 16 months after he was  
27 prescribed this medication -- there was no mention by the mental health staff of referring  
28 Mr. [REDACTED] to the psychiatrist for a dose augmentation. Fifteen milligrams of Abilify is a

1 low dose of the medication. He should be tried on at least 30 mg daily. If that 30 mg dose  
2 doesn't eliminate the auditory hallucinations, then the patient should be tried on a more  
3 potent antipsychotic such as Risperdal.

4 119. Other examples of patients who remain highly symptomatic include:

- 5 • [REDACTED]
- 6 [REDACTED]
- 7 [REDACTED]
- 8 • P [REDACTED]
- 9 [REDACTED]
- 10 • P [REDACTED]
- 11 [REDACTED]
- 12 • T [REDACTED]
- 13 [REDACTED]

14 See Exhibit 2 for more detailed discussions of these patients' care.

15 **2. Opinion: ADC's Practice of Removing and Changing Mental Health**  
16 **Diagnoses Puts Class Members at Risk of Harm**

17 120. Another disturbing trend I noticed in my September 2021 interviews and  
18 review is what I refer to as de-diagnosing. In many cases, persons who for years had been  
19 diagnosed with major mental illnesses such as schizophrenia or other psychotic disorders,  
20 bipolar disorder, or major depression had their diagnoses abruptly changed to behavioral  
21 disorders like personality disorders, or other less serious conditions such as "unspecified"  
22 mood disorders.

23 121. This is highly implausible. Major mental illnesses like schizophrenia are  
24 lifelong conditions. They can, and should, be effectively treated and managed, but they  
25 cannot be "cured" – the patient will always have a diagnosis of schizophrenia, even if she  
26 is no longer experiencing significant symptoms.

27 122. There are only two possibilities: either the initial diagnosis of major mental  
28 illness was incorrect – in which case the patient was not receiving appropriate treatment –



1 or that original diagnosis was correct and is now being inappropriately changed. Even if it  
2 were plausible that all of these patients were incorrectly diagnosed with major mental  
3 illness – often over a period of many years and by a number of different clinicians – there  
4 was typically not adequate assessment and documentation in the record to justify the  
5 change of diagnosis made by Centurion mental health staff.

6 123. For example, I interviewed Named Plaintiff [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] at  
7 ASPC-Eyman in a confidential setting on 9/8/21. He was responding to internal stimuli,  
8 hearing voices, displayed manic-agitated behavior, had pressured speech and was very  
9 paranoid. He reported that he had a history of self-injurious behavior and that he had  
10 received an injection of long-acting Haldol, 50 mg, on 8/23/21. A review of his records  
11 revealed that his diagnosis was changed from Schizoaffective Disorder, bipolar type to  
12 unspecified personality disorder. This is blatantly inaccurate. Even if it were accurate, you  
13 do not treat a personality disorder with 50 mg of long-acting Haldol every four weeks.

14 124. At Tucson Rincon Mental Health Unit, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] is  
15 prescribed Depakote 250 mg twice a day and Vistaril 50 mg at bedtime, for his newest  
16 diagnosis of Unspecified Mood Disorder. Past documentation of Schizophrenia and  
17 Schizoaffective disorders on 8/5/2021 have been discontinued. A previous initial  
18 encounter on 8/16/2019 diagnosed Unspecified Schizophrenia. In the recent past he was  
19 also taking Paxil, Oxcarbazepine, Olanzapine, and Prolixin Decanoate. This record does  
20 not contain adequate assessment or discussion to justify a change in diagnosis from a  
21 primary psychotic disorder to only a mood disorder.

22 125. When I first evaluated Named Plaintiff [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] in 2013, he  
23 had a long history of treatment for a diagnosis of bipolar disorder. Since I saw him, he has  
24 been assigned a number of different mental health diagnoses, including Bipolar Disorder  
25 NOS (5/13/15), Unspecified mood disorder (11/14/16), Anxiety disorder (3/14/19), and  
26 Adjustment disorder (5/21/20). Most recently, after a 5-minute cell front visit on 7/29/21,  
27 a psych associate concluded that Mr. [REDACTED] – after decades of diagnoses and treatment –  
28 now no longer suffers from a mental disorder. If this assessment is accurate (which is

1 extremely unlikely), then Mr. [REDACTED] was misdiagnosed and inappropriately treated for at  
 2 least eight years, including unnecessary treatment with powerful psychotropic medications  
 3 that can have serious side effects. Or, much more plausibly, he is currently misdiagnosed  
 4 and not receiving appropriate treatment.

5 126. Other examples of de-diagnosing, or changing peoples' diagnoses from  
 6 psychiatric disorders to "behavior disorders" or "mood disorders" include:

- 7 • [REDACTED]
- 8 [REDACTED]
- 9 • [REDACTED]
- 10 • [REDACTED]
- 11 • [REDACTED]
- 12 • [REDACTED]

13 127. Unfortunately, such "de-diagnosing" is a recognized phenomenon in prison  
 14 mental health systems, particularly those that are subject to litigation. Because the mental  
 15 health services a patient receives are typically dependent upon his or her diagnosis, or  
 16 classification, de-diagnosing reduces the burden on what is perhaps already an overtaxed  
 17 and understaffed prison mental health system. Where the system's performance is being  
 18 monitored as part of an injunction or settlement in litigation, de-diagnosing can make that  
 19 performance look better than it actually is. I cannot, of course, know whether the de-  
 20 diagnosing I have observed in ADC is occurring for this reason, but whatever the reason,  
 21 it falls below the standard of care and puts patients at risk of harm.

22 **D. Opinion: The Failure to Properly Prescribe, Deliver, and Manage**  
 23 **Psychotropic Medications Puts Class Members at Risk of Harm.**

24 128. The proper prescription, administration (delivery), and monitoring and  
 25 management of medication is an essential element of mental health treatment. Patients  
 26 who are not prescribed appropriate medications responsive to their needs, or who do not  
 27 receive their medications as prescribed, will not improve and will almost always  
 28 deteriorate, often to a point of being a danger to themselves and others, or becoming

1 gravely disabled. In a prison setting, the patient is entirely dependent on the prison health  
2 care staff to prescribe, obtain, and timely deliver the medications necessary to treat their  
3 mental illness.

4 **1. Opinion: An Inadequate Formulary Results in People Not Receiving**  
5 **Medications Best Suited to Address Their Symptoms**

6 129. As noted in multiple interviews, people with major psychiatric conditions  
7 repeatedly told me that they had been prescribed certain medications prior to coming to  
8 prison, or at some point during their incarceration, that were abruptly changed to a less  
9 efficacious medication, on the basis that the better-performing medication was “not on the  
10 formulary.” In some cases, the prescribing providers even stated that was the reason for  
11 the discontinuation of (or refusal to prescribe) the specific medication.

12 130. I reviewed the July 2021 version of Centurion’s formulary for ADCRR that  
13 was provided by Defendants in this matter. ADCRR00096790-96818. I identified several  
14 problematic omissions and inclusions.

15 131. Among the antidepressant agents, the most obvious omission (and one I  
16 heard about repeatedly from patients I interviewed in September 2021) is Wellbutrin. This  
17 is a well-studied medication that is very effective in treating depression. This medication  
18 should be an option for the prescribers.

19 132. Also, the formulary listed Imipramine and Nortriptyline as available  
20 antidepressants. Both of these medications are not currently used in clinical practice due  
21 to their terrible side effect profiles. These medications come from the “Pre-Prozac era”  
22 and have no business being used today. Additionally, both of these medications place the  
23 user at significant risk of heat-related problems due to their being highly anticholinergic.

24 133. Among the antimanic agents, the obvious omission (and again, one I heard  
25 about several times from patients during my visits) is Trileptal. This medication is highly  
26 effective in treating patients with Bipolar Disorder. This medication is also used to  
27 successfully treat self-harmers with poor impulse control.

1           134. With regard to antipsychotic agents, the obvious omissions are Seroquel and  
2 Clozapine. Seroquel is a sedating antipsychotic which is used in those patients with  
3 psychosis and also have sleep problems. Clozapine is an extremely effective  
4 antipsychotic, used to treat those psychotic patients who do not respond to trials of  
5 conventional antipsychotics. This medication should definitely be on Centurion's  
6 formulary and available to psychiatrists to prescribe.

7           135. Also, the formulary includes three drugs that should not be used:  
8 Perphenazine, Prochlorperazine, and Trifluoperazine. These three medications are *not*  
9 used in modern clinical practice. They have side effect profiles that put the user at serious  
10 risk for heat-related problems, which given the high heat found in many of ADCRR's  
11 unairconditioned or poorly ventilated buildings, should not be used on patients.

## 12           **2. Opinion: Inadequate Medication Administration and Distribution Systems** 13           **Fall Below the Standard of Care**

14           136. In my 2013 report, I discussed ADC's inability to properly manage the  
15 delivery of medication to mental health patients. (Doc. 1104-2 at 21-29). Proper timing for  
16 the delivery of psychotropic medications is critical: often medications are extended  
17 release and must be timed with a consistent frequency every 12 or 8 hours. Other  
18 medications, for example, Geodon, must be taken on a full stomach or at the time of  
19 meals; otherwise much of the medication is not metabolized or absorbed. Failure to  
20 provide timely and consistent delivery and administration of psychotropic medication  
21 places patients at substantial risk of serious harm, including pain and suffering,  
22 withdrawal symptoms, or deterioration.

23           137. Timely delivery and administration of medication relies upon having  
24 enough nursing staff available to run efficient "pill calls" or "med pass" (at lower security  
25 yards) at a set given time, or to have enough nursing staff to be able to go through  
26 isolation and high-security units to deliver medication cell-front to patients. Even if the  
27 "pill calls" are occurring at facilities, if there is only one nurse responsible for distributing  
28 the medications, and there are dozens of persons (or on some yards, 100-200 persons)

1 waiting in line, patients report that they will sometimes refuse or give up because they are  
2 unable to stand for long periods in extreme temperatures.

3 138. ADCRR still lacks a reliable system to ensure medications are provided to  
4 patients as prescribed. For example, the March 2021 CQI minutes from Tucson indicate  
5 “multiple med errors for missed doses” and “we are still seeing meds not given according  
6 to order” (ADCRRM19493-500). Similar notations appear in the March 2021 CQI  
7 minutes at Perryville (“multiple med errors were submitted”) (ADCRRM19473) and  
8 Eyman (“multiple medication errors were discovered”) (ADCRRM19940).

9 139. I also was extremely concerned to review the summary of Defendants’  
10 Incident Reports from the fall of 2019 at the Yuma and Eyman prisons that detailed  
11 numerous delays or cancellations of the delivery of medications. *See* Doc. 3431-1 at 2-6;  
12 Doc. 3508-1 at 4-21.

13 140. Multiple patients housed at the Phoenix-Aspen Unit (an outpatient  
14 specialized mental health program for SMI men classified as MH-4), reported that due to  
15 a shortage of “pill nurses” at the Phoenix prison, the morning medications that should be  
16 delivered at 7:00 am are often delivered much later -- including as late as 10:00 am, and  
17 that the evening medications were then delivered at 3:30 or 4:00 pm. If that is the  
18 frequency with which psychotropic or other timed medications prescribed for twice daily  
19 administration are delivered, it can create complications: first, in providing two doses so  
20 close together, and next, having a long period of time during the night where the  
21 medications wear off. The August 2021 staffing report from Centurion confirms there is a  
22 shortage at Phoenix, where there are 5.75 contracted Nursing Assistant / Patient Care  
23 Technician at the facility, but only 1.9 FTE filled positions. (ADCRR00137140).

24 141. This is not a recent problem. CQI minutes revealed earlier breakdowns in  
25 the delivery of medications at Phoenix:

- 26 • Phoenix January 2021 CQI minutes (16 patients in Baker Unit were  
27 erroneously given their medications at 4:00 p.m. and again at 8:00 p.m.;  
28 “The error occurred due to several breakdowns in communications and  
staff education error using the Off-Line MAR.”) ADCRRM0013395

- Phoenix June 2021 CQI minutes (“medication errors were noted and discussed with individual staff”). ADCRR00107317.

142. Another component of medication administration is making sure that prescriptions are refilled and renewed without interruption. Performance Measure 13 of the Stipulation requires that “[c]hronic care and psychotropic medication renewals will be completed in a manner such that there is no interruption or lapse in medication.” But the 2021 data show that many prisons cannot reach the 85% compliance threshold – a cut off level that is too low, as it still condones as acceptable that staff fail 15% of the time. I do not think it is acceptable that 15% of all mentally ill prisoners could day after day experience interruptions in receiving their psychotropic medications, or that on any given day 15% of all patients didn’t get their medications. This is such a critical part of ensuring ongoing stability for patients, that the threshold for compliance on a critical performance measure should be set much higher than the 85% threshold:

|            | Jan.<br>2021 | Feb.<br>2021 | Mar.<br>2021 | Apr.<br>2021 | May<br>2021 | June<br>2021 | July<br>2021 |
|------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|
| Douglas    | 97           | 100          | 100          | 100          | 93          | 96           | 96           |
| Eyman      | 86           | 84           | 84           | 80           | 92          | 88           | 92           |
| Florence   | 88           | 65           | 77           | 86           | 88          | 88           | 75           |
| Lewis      | 69           | 95           | 93           | 99           | 85.71       | 91           | 77           |
| Perryville | 84           | 82           | 86           | 79           | 74          | 73           | 85.56        |
| Phoenix    | 94           | 91           | 91           | 97           | 98          | 95           | 100          |
| Safford    | 90           | 90           | 100          | 90           | 100         | 97           | 100          |
| Tucson     | 90           | 94           | 94           | 82           | 67          | 70           | 79           |
| Winslow    | 100          | 100          | 100          | 100          | 93          | 100          | 100          |
| Yuma       | 64           | 74           | 78           | 74           | 68          | 76           | 96           |

### 3. Opinion: The Inadequate Monitoring and Management of Psychotropic Medication and Side Effects Puts Class Members at Risk of Harm

143. In past reports I have described examples of a profoundly broken psychopharmacology system in ADCRR. Patients taking psychotropic medication need to be monitored by a psychiatrist. Full stop.

144. The frequency depends on the clinical situation, but in no cases should it be

1 any less frequently than every 90 days. ADCRR still lacks a reliable system to ensure that  
2 incarcerated people taking psychotropic medications are meaningfully evaluated on a  
3 regular basis by a psychiatrist. It is essential that a patient who discontinues psychotropic  
4 medication be closely followed by a psychiatrist in case the patient decompensates and  
5 medications need to be restarted. This was not done in cases I reviewed.

6 145. Many psychotropic medications have side effects, some of which can be  
7 quite serious and, if not properly managed, can result in permanent damage to the patient.  
8 For example, long-term use of potent antipsychotics can result in tardive dyskinesia,  
9 which is a nervous system condition that causes repetitive, involuntary twitching,  
10 grimacing, lip-smacking, eye-blinking, and movement in the extremities. Any sign of  
11 these side effects must be closely monitored and measured using a diagnostic tool like the  
12 Abnormal Involuntary Movement Scale (“AIMS”), and if necessary, have the medications  
13 adjusted or changed. Another example is that certain antidepressants cause significant  
14 weight gain in patients, and this can lead to metabolic problems such as Type II diabetes,  
15 and it is important to monitor weight gain in patients on these antidepressants. Patients on  
16 atypical antipsychotics such as Risperdal and Zyprexa may experience metabolic side  
17 effects such as increased triglycerides, hyperlipidemia, and increased cholesterol. Due to  
18 the serious physical implications of these side effects, baseline blood levels must be taken  
19 before starting the patient on these atypical antipsychotics, and frequent checks (at least  
20 every six months) must be made to monitor the blood parameters.

21 146. Thus, monitoring of and management of medication side effects is an  
22 essential element of mental health and psychiatric treatment. ADC does not have an  
23 adequate system in place to monitor and manage medication side effects. On my visits, I  
24 observed many patients who obviously suffered from side effects that were not adequately  
25 managed and, in some cases, not noted in the medical chart.

26 147. I spoke to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] at Eyman on 9/8/21. I interviewed Mr.  
27 [REDACTED] when he was on a “security watch” for the suspicion of drinking alcohol. He  
28 said he had been on watch for more than two days and had not received his regular dose of

1 Prozac 40 mg daily during this time. He also reported his anxiety was increasing and he  
2 was beginning to have headaches. Of note, increased anxiety and severe headaches are  
3 common symptoms associated with Prozac withdrawal. A review of his records shows he  
4 was prescribed Prozac 40 mg daily, and that he did not get it on September 7, 8, or 9,  
5 2021. This represents poor medication management. Antidepressant medications cannot  
6 just be abruptly stopped, as the patient is at risk of an occurrence of a serious withdrawal  
7 syndrome. Finally, his Prozac order was renewed on 9/16/21 without his being seen.

8 148. I attempted to interview [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] at cell front on 9/8/21 at  
9 Eyman. When I approached his cell, he was pacing while shouting at non-existent  
10 individuals, and displayed rambling and incoherent speech. After many attempts, I could  
11 not engage him in a proper interview. A review of his records revealed that his most  
12 current diagnosis (dated 6/11/18), is Schizoaffective Disorder, unspecified type. His  
13 medication is a low dose of the antipsychotic Abilify, 5 mg twice a day. A psychiatric  
14 progress note from 8/19/21 noted that he has tangential thought processes, delusional  
15 thought content, paranoia and auditory/visual hallucinations. This comported with my  
16 observations three weeks later. But the note did not contain any discussion about  
17 augmenting or modifying the antipsychotic treatment. Finally, a treatment plan dated  
18 9/1/21 by a psych associate noted Mr. [REDACTED] psychosis but did not mention anything  
19 about referring him back to the psychiatrist for a medication adjustment. This is poor care,  
20 as the patient is highly symptomatic but nothing is being done to address psychotic  
21 symptoms. Abilify 5 mg twice a day is very low dose, as this medication can be safely  
22 prescribed at 30 or 40 mg daily.

23 149. I interviewed [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] at his cell front at Eyman on 9/8/21. He  
24 reported a diagnosis of schizophrenia and that he was prescribed the antipsychotic  
25 Zyprexa, at 15 mg every evening. He complained of having auditory hallucinations which  
26 “remain very bothersome,” but that the psychiatrist won’t increase the dose of the Zyprexa  
27 because he has high cholesterol. A record review confirmed he is only prescribed 15 mg  
28 of Zyprexa daily, and that his cholesterol is high 248 (0-200 is normal). Mr. [REDACTED] also



1 had elevated triglycerides, a measure of fat in the blood, of 358 (0-150 is normal). These  
2 abnormal labs are an unfortunate metabolic side effect experienced by some patients who  
3 receive antipsychotics such as Zyprexa. A psychiatric progress note dated 8/26/21 states  
4 that Mr. [REDACTED] reported that, "I always hear voices; I think it's spirits in here." Here, we  
5 have a case in which the patient has persistent bothersome psychotic symptoms and is  
6 experiencing dangerous metabolic side effects from his antipsychotic medication.  
7 Continuing with the status quo is not acceptable. The standard of care in this case requires  
8 that the patient be switched to a different antipsychotic that has fewer side effects and that  
9 he be closely monitored to see if his triglycerides and cholesterol levels go down.  
10 Currently, Mr. [REDACTED] is experiencing the worst of two worlds, unresolved psychotic  
11 symptoms, and serious medication side effects.

12 150. I spoke with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] on 9/10/21, cell-front at the inpatient  
13 Mental Health Unit at Perryville. She is an older woman classified as SMI who has a  
14 diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type. When I spoke with her, she had  
15 confused, nonsequential speech, with difficulty following her own train of thoughts, and  
16 she appeared with severe psychotic symptoms and an elated affect. She had quite  
17 observable tardive dyskinesia with clearly shaking extremities and uncontrolled jerking  
18 movements in her face and extremities. According to her medical chart, a psychiatric  
19 provider saw her on 9/16/21, within days of my visit. The provider documented symptoms  
20 of florid psychosis and that Ms. [REDACTED] was delusional, nude, bizarre, and aggressive, but  
21 the provider did not document the clearly obvious tardive dyskinesia – in fact, the  
22 "Appearance and Behavior" section of the entry was left blank. The provider increased  
23 Ms. [REDACTED]'s Risperidone with follow up planned for thirty days at the inpatient  
24 psychiatric unit.

25 151. Ms. [REDACTED]'s last documented AIMS test was done on 6/16/21 with a score  
26 of 0, which does not seem reasonable given the severity of symptoms that I observed, and  
27 implies that the AIMS was not appropriately performed. I could not find any indication  
28 that a future AIMS test is scheduled or when it will be preferred. This carelessness is

1 concerning as there is a lack of monitoring of the side effects of her psychotropic  
2 medications. Furthermore, Ms. [REDACTED]'s grossly psychotic behavior should have been  
3 followed more frequently by the psychiatric provider on the inpatient psychiatric unit.  
4 Follow-up at one month is not appropriate given that response to Risperidone dosage can  
5 be seen earlier and monitoring for side effects is crucial. Once again Ms. [REDACTED] is being  
6 treated at the outpatient level of care in terms of frequency of contacts by the prescriber.

7 152. Another woman at Perryville's step-down mental health unit, [REDACTED]  
8 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] told us she had started refusing Haldol injections after she was  
9 hospitalized for three days due to low potassium and sodium levels. Her medical record  
10 showed that on 2/23/2021, the provider started her on injectable long-acting Haloperidol  
11 Decanoate. The note had a box for "consent form" unchecked. It was not until 7/12/2021  
12 after she experienced side effects from Haldol that there was written mention of actually  
13 discussing risks and side effects with this medication. It was during this encounter that the  
14 consent form box was finally checked, indicating that she consented to continue such  
15 treatment. A month later, in August 2021, she was admitted to the outside hospital after  
16 she was found suffering seizures on the ground. The documentation revealed the seizures  
17 were due to Psychogenic Polydipsia (uncontrolled drinking of water), which in turn  
18 caused hyponatremia (dangerously low serum sodium levels). Haldol can both lower  
19 seizure threshold and cause a syndrome of inappropriate secretion of antidiuretic hormone  
20 (SIADH), which can manifest as increased consumption of water with a simultaneous  
21 reduction in urine output. SIADH is a well-known side effect of the use of Haldol. Upon  
22 return from the hospital, the psychiatric team did not mention any of these recent events,  
23 nor was there any discussion about medications to maintain stabilization of mental health  
24 concerns, given her refusal of the Haldol, without any clear plans.

25 153. Other examples of a failure to manage or address the side-effects of  
26 medication include:

27 • Eyman: [REDACTED]

28 • Perryville: [REDACTED]

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- P [REDACTED]
- Tucson: [REDACTED]

See Exhibit 2.

154. It is also critically important to monitor the blood levels of certain psychotropic medications, such as Lithium. If the level is too low, the patient will not receive the desired therapeutic effect; if it is too high, it can be toxic. Lithium levels need to be checked at least every six months. Monitoring the patient’s lithium level is especially important in the heat of Arizona as lithium makes a person very susceptible to heat-related illnesses. ADC does not appear to have a reliable system in place to monitor and, when necessary, adjust medication levels.

155. Patients whose medication levels were not adequately monitored include:

- [REDACTED] he had been taking Lithium (which is [REDACTED] or more than 13 years. On December 31, 2020, he was seen by nursing for an ICS – “Speech was incoherent. Incontinent of urine. Confused and disoriented.” He was sent to the hospital, where labs showed acute renal failure and a Lithium level >4, which is extremely elevated and dangerous (normal levels are 0.6-1.2 mEq/L). [REDACTED] 21, he tested positive for COVID-19, and he died on [REDACTED]. The ADC Mortality Review includes the following con

*There were significant lapses in lithium monitoring. It is unclear why a level was not performed in December 2020. May have been due to the patient being housed in isolation at that time. Appropriate observations were made about the patient’s altered mental status prior to the ICS, but appropriate actions were not taken.*

*Including lithium toxicity in the differential diagnosis in these situations is important in guiding decision making and treatment. Consider provider education for all providers regarding lithium toxicity, as well as toxicity from other psychiatric medications.*

On the box asking “is it likely that the patient’s death was caused by or affected in a negative manner by medical or mental health personnel?” the reviewer checked “Yes.” “Complications of treatment for bipolar disorder” was listed as a contributory cause of death.

- [REDACTED] I interviewed Mr. [REDACTED] cell front on 9/8/21 at [REDACTED] me that his diagno [REDACTED] either Schizoaffective Disorder or Bipolar Disorder. He reports that his condition was previously well controlled on the antipsychotic, Seroquel, but was told

1 that he can't have it now. A review of his records revealed that his  
2 current diagnosis is "Unspecified Mood Disorder" and is treated with  
3 Lithium, Zyprexa and Cogentin. There was no explanation in the record  
4 why his diagnosis was changed. Of note, his last documented lithium  
5 level is from 10/16/20.

6 156. Other class members with poorly followed blood testing for drugs such as  
7 Lithium and Depakote include: Perryville: [REDACTED]; Phoenix: [REDACTED]  
8 [REDACTED]. See Exhibit 2.

### 9 **3. Opinion: The Failure to Mitigate the Risk of Heat Injury To People on** 10 **Psychotropic Medications Places Class Members at Risk of Harm**

11 157. It is a well-established medical fact that people with mental illness, or  
12 people taking psychotropic medications, are at greater risk of suffering serious heat-  
13 related health problems. These problems include heat exhaustion and heat stroke. These  
14 are conditions in which the body's temperature-regulating system breaks down and  
15 internal body temperature rises, sometimes causing irreversible brain damage and organ  
16 system failure. The death rate for heat stroke ranges from 10% to 75%, depending on  
17 several variables, including how promptly treatment is sought.

18 158. People with mental illness are a high-risk group due to several factors. Their  
19 cognitive functioning can often be impaired, which can prevent them from taking  
20 adequate precautions to protect themselves from heat-related health problems. Also, some  
21 of the symptoms of heat-related health problems such as feeling poorly, irritability,  
22 anxiety, and confusion can also be seen in a variety of mental illnesses. This often results  
23 in the mentally ill – and their treating providers, or persons who live or work around them  
24 – not even appreciating that they are suffering from heat-related health problems versus a  
25 manifestation of their mental illness.

26 159. Another extremely serious risk factor that places the mentally ill at greater  
27 risk of suffering from heat-related problems is the use of psychotropic medications. Many  
28 medications used to treat mental illness increase the risk of heat-related health problems.  
Antipsychotic medications impair the body's ability to regulate its own temperature.  
Antipsychotic, antidepressant, and anticholinergic medications all impair the body's

1 ability to perspire, and hence cool itself off. Lithium causes significant fluid loss that can  
2 exacerbate heat-related health problems. Finally, a common side effect of psychotropic  
3 medications is sedation. All of these factors combine to place the mentally ill, especially  
4 those treated with psychotropic medications, at significant risk of suffering from heat-  
5 related health problems, including serious injury and death. For all of these reasons,  
6 protection from heat injury is an essential element of the proper use of psychotropic  
7 medications to treat mental illness.

8 160. Given the inhospitable hot temperatures that pervade the State of Arizona  
9 for much of the year, Defendants and their correctional and mental health staff must be  
10 acutely alert to the substantial risk of harm to incarcerated people with mental illness  
11 and/or people taking psychotropic medications, who are in their custody.

12 161. Heat-related health problems are completely preventable. At-risk people,  
13 including those taking psychotropic medications, should be housed in areas where the  
14 ambient temperature does not exceed 85 degrees Fahrenheit. Even in this relatively cool  
15 (compared to the average outdoor Arizona temperature) environment, at risk persons need  
16 to have unlimited access to cold fluids. The temperature of the fluids is important as the  
17 body absorbs cooler solutions faster. Cold water is the best type of fluid replacement.  
18 Other fluids, like Gatorade, should also be provided as they contain electrolytes that are  
19 lost as a body perspires, or as somebody consumes large quantities of cold water.  
20 Humidity is also an important variable, since higher humidity reduces the body's ability to  
21 cool itself through perspiration. Patients taking these medications should be counseled on  
22 heat risk, and staff who supervise or work with at-risk individuals should receive special  
23 training in the recognition and treatment of heat-related health problems.

24 162. It is critically important that correctional facilities have in place effective  
25 policies to ensure that people on psychotropic medications are protected from dangerous  
26 heat levels in their housing units. For example, by court order, the Maricopa County Jail  
27 requires that detainees who take psychotropic medications are housed in areas where the  
28

1 temperature does not exceed 85 degrees Fahrenheit. My understanding is that there is no  
2 such requirement in ADCRR.

3 163. I conducted expert inspections of several ADCRR prisons during September  
4 of 2021. I found the heat in the housing areas to be stifling, and saw obvious signs that  
5 both incarcerated people and staff were suffering from its effects. Numerous incarcerated  
6 people I spoke with who take psychotropic medications described feeling the ill-effects of  
7 the heat, and that they were not provided the opportunity to be in cooler locations.

8 164. I reviewed the temperature data provided by the Defendants in this case.  
9 Although the data are often fragmentary and incomplete, they are sufficient to show that  
10 people in ADCRR's custody who take psychotropic medications are at grave risk of heat  
11 injury or death. Many housing units and dormitories at Arizona prisons are not air  
12 conditioned, or rely upon swamp coolers to lower the ambient temperature. As a result,  
13 spring and summer temperatures of 85 and above are common inside the housing units  
14 and cells, and temperatures of 90 and above occur with some frequency.

15 165. I am particularly concerned to see that temperatures at ASPC-Phoenix  
16 regularly exceed 85 degrees. As detailed above, ASPC-Phoenix is ADCRR's dedicated  
17 mental health facility; it is thus entirely foreseeable that a very large proportion of its  
18 prisoners will be taking psychotropic medications. The absence of effective climate  
19 control at ASPC-Phoenix poses a grave risk of harm to these prisoners. Finally, both my  
20 interviews and my chart reviews confirmed that ADC prisoners taking psychotropic  
21 medications are not routinely counseled on the risk of heat injury or death, how to  
22 recognize its symptoms, and how to protect themselves.

23 **E. Opinion: The Failure to Provide Suicidal and Self-Harming Prisoners Basic**  
24 **Mental Health Care Falls Below the Standard of Care**

25 166. A completed suicide is the ultimate failure of a correctional mental health  
26 system. In my November 2013 report, I concluded that "there are serious deficiencies in  
27 ADC's suicide prevent policies and practices, and ... these systemic policies and practices  
28 pose a substantial risk of serious harm to ADC prisoners." Doc. 1104-2 at 51. Since that

1 report, I've repeatedly detailed deficiencies in suicide prevention and mental health care  
 2 that contribute to preventable suicides. *See id.* at 51-58; Doc. 1104-6, Ex. 8 at 5-10, 24-25;  
 3 Doc. 1104-6, Ex. 10 at 1-8; Doc. 1538-1 at ¶¶ 50-71; Doc. 1627 at ¶¶ 22-23; Doc. 2091 at  
 4 ¶¶ 4-9; Doc. 3782 at ¶¶ 11-32.

5 167. ADCRR data show that Fiscal Year 2021 (July 1, 2020-June 30, 2021) had  
 6 the highest number of suicides since FY 2011.

**INMATE DEATHS BY YEAR AND CAUSE**

| TYPE           | FY 10     | FY 11     | FY 12     | FY 13     | FY 14      | FY 15     | FY 16      | FY 17      | FY 18      | FY 19      | FY 20      | FY 21*     | FY 22*    | Total        |
|----------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|-----------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-----------|--------------|
| Natural Causes | 67        | 64        | 71        | 66        | 91         | 82        | 102        | 107        | 105        | 93         | 128        | 134        | 28        | 1138         |
| Suicide        | 10        | 13        | 6         | 7         | 8          | 6         | 6          | 8          | 7          | 7          | 6          | 10         | 2         | 96           |
| Accidental     | 4         | 5         | 7         | 7         | 3          | 6         | 11         | 15         | 12         | 17         | 8          | 7          | 2         | 104          |
| Homicide       | 5         | 4         | 3         | 3         | 3          | 5         | 6          | 6          | 11         | 2          | 3          | 2          | 0         | 53           |
| <b>TOTAL</b>   | <b>86</b> | <b>86</b> | <b>87</b> | <b>83</b> | <b>105</b> | <b>99</b> | <b>125</b> | <b>136</b> | <b>135</b> | <b>119</b> | <b>145</b> | <b>153</b> | <b>32</b> | <b>1,391</b> |
| ADP            | 40,458    | 40,226    | 40,011    | 40,048    | 41,084     | 42,132    | 42,902     | 42,428     | 42,113     | 42,074     | 42,105     | 36,569     | **35,410  |              |

\*FY 2022 as of 9/30/2021

Includes ADCRR and Contract Beds

\*\* Actual inmate population as of 9/30/2021 ADP – Average Daily Population (for Fiscal Year)

Cause of death figures are subject to change based on official medical examiner reports, which may be issued in a subsequent month

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 11  
 12 See <https://corrections.az.gov/sites/default/files/REPORTS/Assault/2021/assaultmortality-sept21.pdf>

13  
 14 168. The understaffing that I described above in Part III.A. directly contributes to  
 15 the high numbers of suicide. Due to the large caseloads that staff are assigned, they don't  
 16 have the time to perform adequate visits with the mentally ill patients, especially in  
 17 isolation units where getting people out of their cells is extremely difficult and can be  
 18 invasive (for example, high security units that require a person be strip-searched every  
 19 time he leaves or re-enters his cell), or at prisons with perpetual shortages of custody staff  
 20 to escort people to and from a confidential encounter.

21 169. Exhibit 3 includes my analysis and write-ups of the reviews of many of the  
 22 persons who died by suicide since 2019. In many cases, the patients received mental  
 23 health care that fell far below the standard of care in the final months or weeks of their  
 24 lives, including care that did not comply with the Stipulation's mental health performance  
 25 measures, or with the Court's orders about the length of mental health encounters.

26 170. Another ongoing problem I identified is one that has been featured in past  
 27 reports: ADCRR's serious flaws in its suicide prevention program. I previously described  
 28 in Part II.B.1(b), [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] two

1 profoundly mentally ill people at Eyman-Browning who I interviewed on September 8,  
2 2021. Both men described how, *while on continuous mental health watch*, they had been  
3 able to repeatedly engage in serious acts of self-harm and self-mutilation that had resulted  
4 in multiple recent hospitalizations. In my professional opinion, both patients, if left to  
5 their current situation and treatment levels, are at high risk of ultimately engaging in an  
6 act of self-injury that could lead to death.

7 171. I am particularly concerned by the apparently lackadaisical approach to self-  
8 harm taken at ASPC-Phoenix, the system's dedicated mental health facility. Month after  
9 month, the CQI minutes report that one or two patients had a large number of self-harm  
10 incidents. *See* Dec. 2020 Phoenix CQI minutes, ADCRRM0017120 (p. 4) (“Self-Harm  
11 incidents in November: 10 of the 14 incidents were completed by 1 inmate”); Feb. 2021  
12 Phoenix CQI minutes, ADCRRM0018565 (“(13) of the (23) [self-harm] incidents were  
13 completed by (2) patients”); May 2021 Phoenix CQI minutes, ADCRR0056547 (“Self-  
14 Harm incidents in April: 10 of the 17 incidents were completed by 2 IMs”).

15 172. The patients in question are not identified, so I cannot review their records  
16 and ascertain the seriousness of their injuries and their current risk of future harm.  
17 However, it is apparent that some of the self-harm occurring at Phoenix has a high degree  
18 of lethality. *See* ADCRRM0018566 (“ER send out on 1/02/2020 [sic] for a hanging  
19 attempt;” “ER send out on 1/04/2021 for a hanging attempt”).

20 173. This kind of repeated self-harm is extremely dangerous. There is a very  
21 significant risk that one of these self-harm attempts will eventually be fatal, whether the  
22 patient intends it or not. What is extraordinary is that there is no indication that the  
23 Phoenix mental health staff takes this risk seriously. The CQI minutes contain no  
24 indication that any action is ever taken to identify these repeatedly self-harming patients  
25 and adjust their treatment to keep them safe.

26 174. Also, at the Phoenix facility, on April 28, 2021, a patient was able to remove  
27 ten staples from his abdominal wound, and swallow the staples, *while on a continuous*  
28 *watch*. The nurse noted wound dehiscence (splitting open) and “risk for airway



1 obstruction,” and the patient was taken to hospital. I am at a loss to understand how a  
2 patient on a continuous watch, at an inpatient mental health facility, was able to engage in  
3 such a serious act of self-harm. ADCRR0056570-71.

4 175. Other examples of people who had documented acts of self-harm while on  
5 mental health watch, include [REDACTED] (Eyman); [REDACTED]  
6 [REDACTED] (Eyman); [REDACTED] (Perryville); [REDACTED]  
7 (Perryville); [REDACTED] (Perryville); Named Plaintiff [REDACTED]  
8 (Perryville); [REDACTED] (Phoenix); [REDACTED]  
9 (Phoenix); [REDACTED] (Phoenix); Named Plaintiff [REDACTED] (Tucson);  
10 [REDACTED] (Tucson). *See* Exhibit 2.

#### 11 **F. Inappropriate Uses of Force on the Mentally Ill**

12 176. The use of chemical agents on prisoners with mental illness is extremely  
13 harmful and is contraindicated with these patients. It can increase fear, paranoia, and  
14 mistrust; inflict lasting psychological damage; aggravate the symptoms and severity of  
15 mental illness; and reduce the chances of successful mental health treatment in the future.  
16 It can also increase the risk of self-harm or suicide. In many cases, the mentally ill  
17 prisoner against whom chemical agents are used will be in an acutely psychotic state. He  
18 or she may be unable to comply with or even comprehend custody directives because of a  
19 psychotic or delusional state. In these circumstances, the behavior that prompts the use of  
20 chemical agents- disobedience to custody commands- is a direct result of the prisoner's  
21 mental illness. In almost all cases, the use of chemical agents on prisoners with mental  
22 illness can be totally avoided by appropriate mental health care. At the first sign of a  
23 patient decompensating, appropriate mental health intervention should be utilized to  
24 prevent worsening of their underlying condition. If the prisoner is failing to comply with  
25 custody directives, mental health staff should be called to speak with the prisoner, both to  
26 attempt to persuade the prisoner to comply and to assess whether the prisoner's behavior is  
27 a symptom of his or her mental illness.

28

1 177. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] is classified as SMI, and carries a diagnosis of  
2 “other specified schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorders.” Custody officers  
3 sprayed him with OC on August 31, 2021 after he used a wire to cut his left wrist. He then  
4 received a five-minute cell-front encounter with a psych associate; the note indicates that  
5 the patient was not offered the opportunity to speak with the clinician in a confidential  
6 area. The psych associate wrote:

7 TW [the psych associate] tried to engage Pt in conversation, but Pt had a  
8 difficult time talking due to being sprayed by OC spray. Pt reported to TW  
9 that he is having fear issues. He stated multiple times, “I have lots of fear  
right now.”

10 178. It is not surprising that the patient would “have lots of fear” after having  
11 chemical weapons used on him by custody staff. This incident likely aggravated his pre-  
12 existing paranoia. *See Exhibit 2.*

13 179. As described above, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] at Phoenix-Baker is classified  
14 as SMI and diagnosed with a psychotic disorder. Custody staff have repeatedly used OC  
15 spray on him while he was in crisis, including on September 13, September 5, August 30,  
16 and August 15, 2021. The record indicates that in addition to OC spray, a “fogger” was  
17 also used against him on August 30, 2021. That all of these incidents occurred while Mr.  
18 [REDACTED] was housed at ASPC-Phoenix, the prison system's designated mental health  
treatment facility, is especially disturbing. *See Exhibit 2.*

19 180. The psych autopsy for [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] who died by suicide on  
20 August 27, 2020, at Eyman SMU-I's Complex Detention Unit, showed that he was placed  
21 in solitary confinement eight days before his death, and he was pepper sprayed by officers  
22 a few hours before he hanged himself. *See Exhibit 3.*

23 181. A paradigmatic example of excessive use of force on people with serious  
24 mental illness is the case of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] I had planned to interview him  
25 during my visit to the Phoenix facility on September 23, 2021, because he had appeared  
26 dozens of times on Defendants' self-harm and suicide watch logs for the months before  
27 my visit, but upon my arrival I was told that he had been transferred to a different facility  
28

1 hours earlier that very same morning. He has been diagnosed with several serious mental  
2 illnesses, including schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder. The most recent reports  
3 Defendants provided showed that he had had frequent lengthy stays on suicide watch and  
4 had chemical weapons used against him numerous times, including on July 13, 2021  
5 (twice), July 12, 2021, July 9, 2021, July 8, 2021, July 7, 2021, and July 5, 2021 (twice).

6 182. Subsequent to my visit, I reviewed videos of uses of force on him that  
7 Defendants produced after my visit. (ADCRR00159240 and ADCRR00159245). They  
8 were taken at Eyman-Browning Unit on December 16 and December 17, 2020. As of  
9 December 16, 2020, Mr. [REDACTED] had been continuously on watch since December 5,  
10 due to psychotic thoughts and voices telling him that he needed to hurt himself, yet his  
11 medical record shows he was not seen by a psychiatric provider until December 18, 2020  
12 about an adjustment of his medications to address the auditory command hallucinations.

13 183. According to the video production from Defendants, custody staff either  
14 pepper sprayed him or shot him with pepperballs every day from December 10 through  
15 December 25, 2020 (except December 14) for banging his head on the wall and cell door  
16 while on continuous watch. Pepperballs are designed to be launched from up to 150 feet,  
17 but these videos show him being shot at close range.<sup>24</sup>

18 184. The December 16, 2020 video shows Mr. [REDACTED] being sprayed in the  
19 face with pepper spray by custody staff. The video shows Mr. [REDACTED] clothed in a  
20 suicide smock, pacing from the front to the back in his cell, banging his head on the cell  
21 door each time he comes to the front of the cell. There is no indication that mental health  
22 staff were present before he was sprayed, or that custody staff know how to de-escalate  
23 the situation before resorting to force. After he was sprayed, custody staff took him to the  
24 clinic, but he was not decontaminated or allowed to flush the chemicals out of his eyes,  
25 even after he and the nurse discuss that his eye hurts. For much of the time he is in the  
26

27 [REDACTED]  
28 [REDACTED]

1 clinic he is squeezing his eyes shut and appears to be in pain. The nurse in the clinic asks  
2 him what the voices told him, and he reports that they tell him to hurt himself so his  
3 daughter won't be raped by the "beast from the sea," and then tells her that the voices tell  
4 him he is Moses and can end the world in fire and save his daughter.

5 185. After he has been in the clinic for a few minutes, there is a voice in the  
6 video that appears to belong to a Psych Associate. She asks if he is still hearing the voices,  
7 and if he is focusing on happy memories and remembering that it's not real. He says he  
8 doesn't think that works. She says to keep reminding himself they're not real, to "talk the  
9 talk," and that banging his head didn't help stop the voices. He tells her that the voices tell  
10 him that he has to hurt himself to keep his daughter from being raped, and that he will  
11 continue to hurt himself until his daughter lets him know through a telepathic message  
12 that she is safe. The encounter with the mental health staff lasts just two and a half  
13 minutes, and there are two correctional officers and a nurse in the room with him  
14 throughout. He says that his eyes are burning, but they still were not flushed. The end of  
15 the video has only audio, but audio suggests that he was taken out of the clinic without  
16 being decontaminated or having his eyes flushed.

17 186. The December 17 video starts similarly, with Mr. [REDACTED] dressed in a  
18 suicide smock, pacing in his cell and banging his head on the cell front. Within a minute  
19 of the start of the video, custody staff shoot him at close range at least four times with a  
20 semi-automatic pepperball launcher,<sup>25</sup> as seen below:

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28 <sup>25</sup> See <https://www.pepperball.com/products/tac-sf/>.



(ADCRR00159245 at 0:00:59)

187. Again, there is no indication that mental health staff engaged with the patient at all prior to the use of force. The video shows an unidentified person not dressed as a custody officer arriving at his cell seconds before he was shot with pepperballs. This person did not speak to Mr. [REDACTED]. There is also no indication that custody staff have any knowledge of how to de-escalate situations of this nature with mentally ill patients. Before being taken out of his cell, Mr. [REDACTED] shouts “I am invincible!”

188. The video shows him being taken to the medical clinic after he was shot with pepperballs. He is talking about the voices he is hearing, and a custody officer argues with him, saying “this is behavioral, this is your choice to bang your head.” “You chose to bang your head, we told you to stop, and you chose to not stop.” “Each time you do this, you’re going to get shot with a pepperball now. And if that don’t work, I’m gonna tase you.” The officer says that he knows that Mr. [REDACTED] wants to be transferred to Phoenix-Baker (the mental health unit) and “You’re not going to Baker Ward. Period.”<sup>26</sup> Only after leaving the clinic, on the way back to his cell, is he brought to a shower and water sprayed on the places on his back where he was shot with the pepperballs, more than ten minutes after he was shot.

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<sup>26</sup> These quotations are approximate.



ADCRR00 at 11:39, 11:53.

189. The treatment shown in these videos falls below the standard of care for several reasons. First is the apparent failure to involve mental health staff prior to using force on this patient with serious mental illness. These uses of force were apparently planned sufficiently in advance that they could be video recorded; it is unclear why mental health staff were not asked to engage with Mr. [REDACTED] in an attempt to avoid using force. Unless an emergency requires immediate use of force, mental health staff should always be called and attempt to de-escalate the situation before force is used on a self-harming patient. Second, it is unclear why Mr. [REDACTED] was not immediately decontaminated following the December 16, 2020 use of force. Pepper spray in the eyes and nose can cause excruciating pain, and the failure to immediately decontaminate him, after he had ceased banging his head and was restrained, resulted in needless suffering. Third, it was highly inappropriate for a custody officer to argue with him after the December 17 use of force, and to threaten him with further use of force. Needless to say, a custody officer is not qualified to diagnose the patient, and determine that his self-harm is “behavioral” or a “choice,” or decide whether he would be transferred to a mental health unit. It would have been appropriate for a mental health staff person (not a custody officer) to counsel Mr. [REDACTED] after the use of force, but it appears no mental health

1 staff were present. Finally, it is very concerning that he was self-harming, and was  
2 subjected to the use of force, virtually every day for an entire week before he received any  
3 attention from a psychiatric provider. He had command hallucinations telling him to harm  
4 himself in order to save his daughter. This is a textbook case of severe psychosis requiring  
5 immediate administration of antipsychotic medication, to address the voices causing the  
6 self-harm. After emergency intervention and administration of antipsychotic medications  
7 to stop immediate command hallucinations, a psychiatric provider should have followed  
8 up very soon thereafter to re-evaluate his medication regimen.

9 190. In this case, Mr. [REDACTED] had been on mental health watch since  
10 December 5, when he reported feeling suicidal and hearing voices telling him to hurt  
11 himself. While on watch, he self-harmed, and was subject to use of force, on December  
12 10 and virtually every day thereafter through December 25; he was not seen by a mid-  
13 level psychiatric provider until December 18. This falls far below the standard of care.

14 191. Another patient, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was discussed by Dr. Stefanie  
15 Platt during her deposition on October 15, 2021. Dr. Platt was Centurion's Regional  
16 Director of Mental Health until late July 2021. She was questioned regarding a February  
17 12, 2020 email regarding a patient at ASPC-Phoenix, that reads as follows:

18 Richard and Vanessa,<sup>27</sup>

19 This mental health patient at Phoenix has been self harming by banging his  
20 head for the past several days resulting in multiple ICS events and the use of  
21 OC spray. Mental health appears to be at a loss on how to deal with this  
inmate.

22 In an email sent today the Regional Director of Mental Health basically said  
23 to continue using OC spray as needed while the on site mental health team  
24 comes up with a treatment plan. We are told that Dr. Carr [the Regional  
25 Director of Psychiatry] has been consulted by phone but there is minimal  
26 documentation in the medical record to support any significant involvement  
by a psychiatrist. This inmate now has wounds on the back of his head and  
on his forehead from the head banging. There are staples holding the wound  
edges together on the back of his head but the forehead wound remains open  
as the two previous attempts to staple his frontal wound have failed because

27 <sup>27</sup> Based on the response to this email, it appears that the recipients were former  
28 named Defendant Richard Pratt, Assistant Director of the ADC Medical Services Contract  
Monitoring Bureau, and Vanessa Headstream, an employee of the Monitoring Bureau.

1 of the continuous head banging.

2 We just received a copy of an I/R [incident report] completed by security  
3 staff from last evening indicating that the mental health RN was  
4 encouraging the inmate to bang his head so that the restraint chair could be  
5 used. At the time of this nurse/patient encounter, the patient was NOT  
6 participating in head banging but began banging his head after the nurse told  
7 him to do so ... which resulted in a Use of Force event. This entire event  
8 was captured on video.

9 The FHA [Facility Health Administrator] and mental health apparently had  
10 a meeting this morning about this patient without having any input from  
11 Complex Operations. The FHA reported at the Warden Tracker meeting this  
12 afternoon that:

- 13 • the patient has allegedly lost 30 pounds since December
- 14 • Mental health staff and nursing staff are verbally reporting that the  
15 condition of this patient “is deteriorating” from his normal baseline  
16 standards
- 17 • When asked at the Tracker meeting this afternoon why this situation  
18 has not (apparently) been escalated to a psychiatric emergency with a  
19 Psychiatrist coming to Phoenix to complete a comprehensive  
20 examination and evaluation of this patient, the FHA responded that  
21 Dr. Carr would be coming on **February 24** to assess the patient.  
22 Apparently Dr. Carr is out of town. When the Warden asked the FHA  
23 if there is another Psychiatrist in the system who can come to  
24 Phoenix to assess the patient, she did not know.

25 The Warden and I share the concern that this particular issue is a true  
26 psychiatric emergency and that the response from the Centurion mental  
27 health leaders at the Regional level is inadequate. Warden Weiss is  
28 escalating this concern through his chain of command and I am doing  
likewise.

18 We will keep you updated.

19 Thanks.

20 Richard Watts, RN  
21 Nurse Liaison Program Evaluation Specialist  
22 Prison Operations Division  
23 Arizona Department of Corrections Rehabilitation Reentry  
24 Phoenix Complex

25 ADCRR 78089-90 (emphasis in original).

26 192. Dr. Platt testified that she was aware of this patient and the situation, but at  
27 the time she was not the Regional Mental Health Director who allegedly instructed to  
28 custody staff to “continue using OC spray” while the mental health team came up with a



1 treatment plan.<sup>28</sup> She testified that she and other Centurion leaders at the regional office  
2 level did not have “knowledge that the individual was self-harming repeatedly in this way  
3 at that time” until the email was sent to them.<sup>29</sup>

4 193. This is profoundly troubling for multiple reasons – particularly because this  
5 situation occurred at ASPC-Phoenix, which is supposedly ADC’s dedicated mental health  
6 facility for the most acutely mentally ill persons. It is totally inappropriate under any  
7 context for a nurse to tell a patient to harm himself.<sup>30</sup> Indeed, it is profoundly disturbing  
8 that it is unknown if this nurse was ever disciplined, terminated, or reported to the State  
9 Board of Nursing for investigation for this egregious violation of her duty of care to her  
10 patients. It is completely inappropriate for a nurse to make the decision to place somebody  
11 into a restraint chair, and Dr. Platt testified that the policy has been that only psychologists  
12 and psychiatrists can make orders to place self-harming people in restraints.<sup>31</sup> It is also  
13 inappropriate to direct staff “to continue using OC spray as needed while the on site  
14 mental health team comes up with a treatment plan.”

15 194. And it is incomprehensible that, faced with what Nurse Watts calls “a true  
16 psychiatric emergency,” Dr. Carr (Centurion’s Regional Psychiatric Director) was not  
17 planning to assess the patient until February 24 – *twelve days* after the date of Nurse  
18 Watts’ email. Was there no other Centurion psychiatrist physically in the State of Arizona  
19 who could have evaluated the patient? (Dr. Platt testified that at the time of this incident,  
20 there was no on-site psychiatrist who worked at ASPC-Phoenix, that the psychiatric  
21 provider for the facility was via telehealth, and that there was only one psychiatrist  
22 besides Dr. Carr that worked for Centurion who was physically in Arizona.)<sup>32</sup> Was it not  
23 possible for a psychiatrist from the Arizona State Hospital – which is literally next door to  
24

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25 <sup>28</sup> 10/15/21 Deposition of Dr. Stefanie Platt, 88:17-90:4 (Deposition Exhibit 5).  
Dr. Platt was the Assistant Regional Mental Health Director at the time.

26 <sup>29</sup> *Id.*, 91:4-12.

27 <sup>30</sup> Dr. Platt agreed that it was not an appropriate response by the mental health RN  
to tell the patient to bang his head, and she was not aware of whether the RN was  
disciplined or sanctioned. *Id.*, 91:16-92:15.

28 <sup>31</sup> *Id.*, 92:16-93:2.

<sup>32</sup> *Id.*, 93:12-94:21.

1 ASPC-Phoenix – to evaluate the patient? Even if there was no psychiatrist available to  
2 evaluate the patient in person, an emergent telepsychiatry consult could have, and should  
3 have, been performed.

4 195. Dr. Carr responded to Nurse Watts’ email on February 12. He wrote:

5 This unfortunate situation is a symptom of a larger problem.

6 Numerous elements impede timely intervention, quality of care,  
7 implementation of a comprehensive treatment plan and psychiatric stability.

8 Our inpatient unit needs a larger investment from Psychiatry, Nursing,  
Mental Health, ADC and Medical.

9 As you know our inpatient unit is licensed by DHS. It is imperative we  
10 model our clinical program according to clinical guidelines and license  
rules/regulations.

11 Patient [] is the immediate focus. However, barriers to care, collaboration,  
12 education, training and communication need to be addressed in order to  
implement a solid care plan.

13 (ADCRR0078087).

14 196. The treatment of this profoundly mentally ill patient, as well as that of other  
15 patients cited in my report, is symptomatic of larger problems in ADCRR’s mental health  
16 care system.<sup>33</sup> As described in Part III.C.1, all too often, patients with serious mental  
17 illness who are engaging in serious acts of self-harm or are profoundly symptomatic, are  
18 left to spiral out of control, which results in the “kindling” effect where their neurological  
19 damage can become permanent and worsen. It is the height of irresponsibility for facility  
20 psychiatric providers and mental health clinicians to throw their hands in the air and say,  
21 “we can’t do anything for this patient,” and let the patients cycle ever deeper into  
22 worsening self-injurious and decompensating behavior. This requires a multi-faceted  
23 response by an integrated treatment team, addressing both the therapeutic and psychiatric  
24 needs of the patient. If the patient is repeatedly and continuously engaging in self harm,  
25 there must be (a) emergent / urgent administration of antipsychotic medication to ease the  
26

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27 <sup>33</sup> Dr. Platt testified that she agreed with Dr. Carr’s statement that the treatment of  
28 this patient was symptomatic of larger systemic problems in ADCRR’s correctional  
mental health care system. *Id.*, 95:7-96:17.

1 voices / thoughts prompting and driving the self-harm, (b) very close medication  
2 management and readjustment by the psychiatric provider, and (c) intensive one-on-one  
3 therapeutic management of the patient by clinicians. This is not happening in the cases I  
4 have reviewed.

5 197. At a psychiatric hospital, if a patient were acting this way or feeling these  
6 urges to self harm, there would be one or more mental health staff at the patient's side at  
7 all times, talking to him, relating to him, walking around with him, engaged as much as  
8 possible in a therapeutic interaction and observations. When incarcerated patients reach  
9 such acute and ongoing levels of self-harm, that is the standard of care that they should be  
10 receiving. Having a custody officer sitting at a table reading a book nearby, with a psych  
11 associate passing through once a day, is not what would be done at a psychiatric hospital,  
12 and it is clearly not sufficient to address the self-harm of these patients.

13 198. Moreover, as described above in Part III.C.2, in my discussion of "de-  
14 diagnosing," the response of mental health and custody staff to Mr. [REDACTED] and Mr.  
15 [REDACTED] appears to be a practice of minimizing and dismissing peoples' profound mental  
16 health disorders and clear symptoms of acute psychosis and altered thinking as merely  
17 "behavioral issues," and a belief that these patients are "choosing to bang your head" or  
18 "choosing to cut yourself."

19 199. Finally, these patients' experiences also illustrate my belief that custody  
20 staff assigned to work in facilities or units designated for profoundly mentally ill persons,  
21 must receive specialized training above and beyond whatever is given to all officers, about  
22 how to interact with people with mental illness or developmental disabilities.<sup>34</sup> These

23 \_\_\_\_\_  
24 <sup>34</sup> Dr. Platt testified that custody staff who were assigned to units housing prisoners  
25 with developmental disabilities or mental illness did not receive additional training in  
interacting with these populations, and she agreed it would be helpful if custody staff were  
required to receive such training. *Id.*, 99:15-25.

26 Q: Do you think that custody officers assigned to work at Phoenix or  
27 in suicide units should receive additional training on interacting with people  
with serious mental illness?

28 [...]

The Witness: I absolutely do.

1 patients, by virtue of their mental illness and/or disabilities, can be very difficult to work  
2 with. Custody staff must be trained how to de-escalate and engage with these patients, and  
3 not go to a knee jerk response of chemical agents, pepperball guns, or tasers.<sup>35</sup>

#### 4 **G. Inappropriate Use of Isolated Confinement on People with Mental Illness**

5 200. As noted in Part II above, during my visits I visited most or all of the key  
6 mental health programs in the institution, including all mental health/suicide watch units,  
7 visited segregated units including maximum custody and detention units. The persons  
8 housed in these extreme conditions of isolation were often profoundly mentally ill and in a  
9 very precarious mental health condition. These people with mental illness are particularly  
10 vulnerable to the harsh, stressful, chaotic, and violent conditions that prevail in ADCRR  
11 today, especially in isolation, and are most at risk of self-harm and suicide.

12 201. Isolated confinement – that is, confinement in a cell for 22 or more hours  
13 each day with limited social interaction and environmental stimulation – can be  
14 profoundly damaging to mental health even for prisoners with no known mental illness.  
15 For those with serious mental illness, such as psychotic disorders and major mood  
16 disorders, it can be devastating, leading to severe deterioration in mental health, self-harm,  
17 or suicide. For these reasons, the American Psychiatric Association has declared that  
18 “prolonged segregation of adult inmates with serious mental illness, with rare exceptions,  
19 should be avoided due to the potential for harm to such inmates.” “Prolonged segregation”  
20 is defined as a “duration of greater than 3-4 weeks.”<sup>36</sup>

21 202. The consensus against isolated confinement of people with mental illness  
22 has grown even more robust since I discussed the issue in my 2013 report (pp. 58-60). The  
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24  
25 *Id.*, 106:19-24. She testified that she had recommended that such training occur for  
custody staff at these units, but “the training did not occur.” *Id.*, 106:24-107:14.

26 <sup>35</sup> Dr. Platt also testified that nursing staff were not regularly provided training  
about psychiatric crisis intervention or uses of restraints at the time of the February 2020  
27 incident where the nurse told the patient to bang his head so he could be put into  
restraints. *Id.*, 100:18-101:21.

28 <sup>36</sup> American Psychiatric Association, Position Statement on Segregation of  
Prisoners With Mental Illness, Approved Dec. 2012.

1 National Alliance on Mental Illness “opposes the use of solitary confinement and  
2 equivalent forms of extended administrative segregation for persons with mental  
3 illnesses.”<sup>37</sup> The Society of Correctional Physicians states that “prolonged segregation of  
4 inmates with serious mental illness, with rare exceptions, violates basic tenets of mental  
5 health treatment.”<sup>38</sup> And the National Commission on Correctional Health Care (NCCHC)  
6 states that juveniles, pregnant persons, and persons with mental illness should be  
7 “excluded from solitary confinement of any duration.”<sup>39</sup>

8 203. And placement in isolated confinement can interfere with appropriate  
9 mental health treatment. For example, the ADC Mortality Review for █████ █████  
10 █████ who died (not by suicide) on January 10, 2021, concluded that “there were  
11 significant lapses in lithium monitoring. It is unclear why a level was not performed in  
12 December 2020. May have been due to the patient being housed in isolation at that time.”  
13 ADCRRM26241.

14 204. The psychological autopsy for █████ █████ █████ who died by suicide  
15 in August 2020 in the harsh conditions of Eyman SMU-I’s Complex Detention Unit,  
16 identified his placement in solitary as a likely contributory factor. It noted:

17 His placement in detention and then in maximum custody after requesting  
18 protective segregation appeared to have increased his anxiety level and  
19 negatively affected his sleep and concentration. In retrospect, it appears he  
20 was having difficulty adjusting to a higher level of confinement. Although  
21 he had protective factors such as ongoing family communication and  
22 support as well as a high school diploma (education), these proved to be  
23 insufficient when Mr. Neal was placed in a maximum custody environment.

24 ADCRR155. See also Exhibit 3.

25 205. Finally, I close by describing behavior by ADCRR and Centurion officials  
26 that graphically illustrate the disregard for the risk of harm to class members with mental  
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28 <sup>37</sup> National Alliance on Mental Illness. 2016. Public Policy Platform of the  
National Alliance on Mental Illness. 12th Ed., Sect. 9.8, at [https://www.nami.org/About-  
NAMI/Policy-Platform](https://www.nami.org/About-NAMI/Policy-Platform).

<sup>38</sup> Society of Correctional Physicians. 2013. Position Statement, Restricted Housing  
of Mentally Ill Inmates. [http://societyofcorrectionalphysicians.org/resources/position-  
statements/restricted-housing-of-mentally-ill-inmates](http://societyofcorrectionalphysicians.org/resources/position-statements/restricted-housing-of-mentally-ill-inmates)

<sup>39</sup> National Commission on Correctional Health Care. 2016. Position Statement:  
Solitary Confinement (Isolation). Journal of Correctional Health Care, 22(3), 357-263.

1 illness caused by the harsh and prolonged use of solitary. On the morning of September 8,  
2 2021, I went to ASPC-Eyman Browning's Behavioral Management Unit ("BMU") which  
3 I was told by staff is designated to house MH-4 (seriously mentally ill) patients. These are  
4 small cells with perforated doors and walls, with plexiglass mounted on the inside. As we  
5 entered the unit (Dog cluster, pod 4), I immediately saw that the plexiglass fronting of cell  
6 35 was covered with splattered blood. There were pools of blood on the ground as well.  
7 The people living in the adjacent cells reported that the previous evening, the man in that  
8 cell cut both of his arms and perhaps his legs, and hit an artery. One neighbor reported  
9 that despite the incarcerated people banging on their cell doors and yelling "man down," it  
10 took at least five minutes for officers to respond, and that no effort had been made to clean  
11 this person's cell since the evening before. His neighbors expressed concern that he had  
12 potentially "bled to death" and asked us to monitor death announcements in the coming  
13 days. Pictures of the cell are below and on the following pages:



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Source: ADCRR00137142-46.

206. What I found most striking about all of this was the fact that despite the prison knowing that I would be visiting with an attorney from the ACLU that morning, with the purpose of visiting mental health units, no effort had been made to clean the cell for at least eight to twelve hours. And during my visit, as with all of my visits to Arizona prisons, ADCRR and Centurion insisted on having a large group of unidentified persons from their central offices and the facility follow me and the attorney around, as if getting to watch me do cell-front interviews is some sort of prestigious assignment. In the past when I have stumbled upon or found disturbing problems, there is sometimes an effort (albeit perhaps just for show or half-hearted) by higher-ups barking orders to officers to clean up or address the problem. Not so here. Rather, the entire time that I and the ACLU attorney were speaking to people around this bloody cell, and asking that photos be taken,



1 these ADCRR and Centurion people made no effort to address it – let alone, acknowledge  
2 it. In fact, there were no efforts made by the prison officials from headquarters or the  
3 warden’s office to direct officers or porters that the cell be immediately cleaned. I had  
4 planned to go visit the unit again late in the afternoon before our visit ended to see if staff  
5 had bothered to clean it in the intervening seven hours, but we did not have time.

6 207. I reviewed Plaintiffs’ December 2019 Eyman monitoring report filed with  
7 the Court (Doc. 3508-1, Ex. 1), including the living conditions at Eyman’s isolation units  
8 at Browning and SMU-I. *Id.* at 39-46. I was saddened but not surprised by the descriptions  
9 and photographs of the conditions at Eyman-SMU-I’s mental health watch unit at 1-Baker  
10 in December 2019. Memorably, this included the graffiti within the entrance to the suicide  
11 watch unit, that read, “Don’t go suicidal. This place sucks. Please help me.”:



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Signed October 28, 2021, in Honolulu, Hawai'i.

  
PABLO STEWART, M.D.

1           Respectfully submitted,

2           Dated: October 29, 2021

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45          R. 38(d)

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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on October 29, 2021, I electronically transmitted the above document to the Clerk’s Office using the CM/ECF System for filing and transmittal of a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following CM/ECF registrants:

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